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Since Zambia's independence in 1964,  a large, thriving  increasing foreign aid Icads to a decline in the premium.
parallel market for foreign exchange has coexisted wilh  This effect dominates the indirect effects of real wealth
a rich menu of official exchange rate policies aimed at  and real appreciation,  which work to increase the
achieving a more flexible,  exchange rate and price  premium. Expansive fiscp!  and monetary policy cause
system as well as financial and trade liberalization.  the premium to rise.
Despite aggressive policies in these areas, particularly  Of all the factors that influence the premium and
for the exchange rate, Lhe  black rnark,t premium  have caused exchange rate unification to fail, terms-of-
(defined as the ratio of the black market rate to the  trade shocks dominate. But Lhc  driving force behind
official rate) remains high -averaging  10()  percent for  persistence of the premium was outright laxity in fiscal
1970-88 and more than 400 percent in recent years.  and monetary policy - especially ia 1985 and the
Aron and Elbadawi examine the origins of Lhe  following two years of the exchange rite auctions, and
parallel market, the statistical  properties of the parallel  during the collapse of economic reform in 1987.
premium, and the shocks and macroeconomic policy  Aron and Elbadawi conclude that exchange rate
changes that influence its evolution. Using annual data,  reform without fiscal reform may be futile. Fiscal
they specify and estimate an eciectic error-correction  retrenchment for the first two years of the crawling peg
model for the premium.  was iifluenccd by political  considerations. Zambia is
They find that the la?"c parallel market might havc  one of the most urbanized countries in Africa: about
caused problems in macroeconomic management  and  half the people live in urban areas, and the urban middle
economic reform. A large exchange rate premium as an  class wields considerable influence. This explains Lhe
indicaton of foreign exchange shortages will have  pervasive ensemble of price control and subsidy
direct deleterious impact on copper production and  schemes that have survived reform attempts. But the
export. It can also indirectly hurt copper exports  ratio of government  revenue to G DP has never been
through its negative effect on domnesic  incentives for  below 20 percent (one of the highest rates in Africa)
the officially sanctioned copper economy. A high  despite sharp declines in terms of trade. More emphasis
premium was also found to encourage overimporting  should be given to the political economy and distribu-
(and probably overinvoicing) of officially traded  tional consequences (especially the rural-urban nexus)
imports.  in the carly stages of economic reform.
Aron and Elbadawi find that foreign inflation  and  Zambia's economy, heavily dependent on copper
depreciation of the black market rate (in a cost-push  exports, is particularly susceptibic to external shocks. It
manner) directly increase domestic inflation. Deprecia-  is important to liberalize major trade and financial
lion of the black market rate also signals indirectly Lhat  markets in such a way as to compress the parallel
economic reform lacks credibility and that macroeco-  market and prevent the premium from serving as a
nomic policy is unsustainable. Short-term changes in  major signal to Lhc  economy.
the premium reflect expected changes in policy and  Increased foreign aid could help mitigate the
politics.  destabilizing effcts  of terms-of-trade shocks. This is
The major factor behind the failure of unification  likcly to be most helpful in the carly stages of refoim,
and economic reform is the fundamental  endogeniety of  when it can foster credibility and stabilize the free ratc
the parallel premium in macroeconomic and tradc  - before the forcign sector can begin to rcspond to real
policy - as well as in exogenous terms-of-trade  and  depreciation. Then there will be less need for aid flows
foreign aid shocks. Improving the terms of trade or  to conLinue  at their initial levels.
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The economy of Zambia provides an example of a  thriving and large black  X
market for foreign exchange.  This black market ha. co-existed with a rich
menu of official policies aimed at achieving more flexible exchange rats and
price system as well as financial and trade liberalization.  Despite
aggressive policies in these areas especially with regard to the exchange
rate',  the black market premium (defined as the ratio of the black rate to the
official rate minus one) remains high.  For the 1970-88 period, the premium
averaged 100 percent and exceeded 400 per cent in recent years.
The presence of sizable parallel markets with substantial premiums, such
as the one in Zambia, has Important macroeconomic implications.  The
theoretical models of dual exchange rates, e.g. Lisondo (1987  a,b) and
Dornbusch (1986),  and their extensiona and elaboration to the case of black
markets, e.g. Dornbusch et al (1983)  and Pinto (1987, 88a, 88b), derive a
steady state solution for the premium that depends on the fiscal deficit ratio
and the parameters of trade and exchange rate policy.  Furthermore, key
macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, foreign trade flows, and the real
exchange rate can also be shown to be influenced by (or jointly determined
with) the premium, e.g. Kamin and Elbadawi (1990), Elbadawi (1989).  The
empirical tradition on this literature however, is still in its infancy.  One
of the main objectives of this paper is to develop empirical models linking
the premium to the above macroeconomic indicators and to use Zambian data to
assess the extent and dynamics of these linkages.
'Since  the country's  ndependence in 1964 to present, six distinct
episodes of exchange rate regimes - including an auction - can be identified
(see  Table 1 (a)).-2-
Evidence from the above models can shed light on the recent experience in
Zambia of aborted reforms, macroeconomic instability and recurrent policy
reversals. 2 The failure of the Zambian economic reform of the last  decade,
especially those aspects of the reform related to the foreign exchange auction
experiment and the attempts at exchange rate unification, has been suggested
to be the direct outcome of macroeconomic laxity, particularly with regard to
fiscal policy, (Pinto, 1987).  The evidence  of our paper upholds this view.
In addition, exogenous factors that operate through the trade accounts such as
the terms of trade and foreign aid, and expectations reflecting asset market
considerations, are important as potential determinants of the premium in
Zambia.  The empirical results of this paper predict a rising premium as a
result of worsening terms of trade, declining foreign aid, or higher
expectations of future devaluation.
Official dual markets have twice been cr-ated in Zambia: a two tier
auction operated for two months in 1987, and in February, 1990, a dual
exchange rate system was established.  These episodes are either too
short-lived or recently instituted to merit analysis.  Thus, the structure of
multiple markets for foreign exchanle considered in this study will consist of
an official market with an officially managed or auction-determined rate. and
an illegal unofficial market with a freely floating rate.  During the auction
period, a quasi-legalization of the unofficial market occurred with the
introduction of "own funds" import licenses.  The quarterly black market
premium for Zambia is shown in Figure 1 where the considerable regime shifts
of the last two decades are clearly reflected in the evolution of the premium.
21n fact Pinto and van Wijnbergen (1987) argued that the fail- e to
adjust policy for the existence of par&llel markets may be the main cause
behind recent macroeconomic instability in SSA.- 3 -
A statistical analys's of the premium and black rate capturing broad changes
in size and variability across exchange rate episodes is given in Table 1 (b).
Black market rates are available from mid-1970 which omits the period of
the copper boom (1964-74).  It is likely that the premium from 1964 to 1971
would reflect incentives for capital flight due to political uncertainty post
Independence, the presence of exchange controls and an increased demand for
foreign assets during the copper boom.  The premium rose after the negative
copper price shocks of 1971 and 1974,  thereafter following  an upward trend
in tandem with the incroasingly over-valued fixed exchange rate.  In the
controlled float episode from July, 1976, a continuous dcvnward trend in the
premium ensued which was maintained under the crawling peg, after 1983.  A
sharp rise for 1985 was due to the break with I.M.F. late in 1984, but the
auction in its early stages saw a low  premium.  The premium fluctuated
considerably during the auction, but the trend was to higher values after
August, 1986.
Across exchange rate episodes the average premium has declined, though
rose by a factor of ten in the final episode.  The black market rate has
continuously depreciated across the five episodes.  Both the premium and the
black market rate exhibit decreasing stability across exchange rate episodes
(though variability declined during the auction).  In part this may be related
to bubbles and crashes reflecting agents' reactions to accumulated
mismanagements and to speculation.  Speculative aspects and the distribution
of the premium are analyzed in Section V.
Three key aspects will be examined in this paper.  First, the origin of
the parallel market and the statistical properties of the premium are
analyzed.  The factors influencing  the premium in various episodes are-4-
considered  and  the  premium  is stimated  using  annual  data.
Secondly,  the effects  of the  premium  on inflation  and  on recorded  avd
unrecorded  (illegal)  trade  fli  w  are  considered. There  in a paucity  of
empirical  research  on the  role  of smuggling  and  misinvoicing  of exports  and
imports  in response  to the  premium  and  trade  policy. An attempt  is  made here
to quantify  these  responses  and  to link  them  to changes  in policy  and  the
premiun. A premium  on  foreign  exchange  serves  as a  tax  on exports  and  a
subsidy  on  imports.  The  fiscal  impact  of the  premium  in Zambia  is important
in  the  uniflcation  of official  and  unofficial  exchange  rates,  where a lose  of
revenue  implicit  in  the  demise  of the  unofficial  market  may have induzed
inflation  tax  to be substituted  for  it in  the  early  stages  of the auction
(Pinto,  op cit).
Finally,  Zambia  has  attempted  unification  of official  and  unofficial
rates  of exchange  in  two  distinct  episodes:  first,  by pre-announced  monthly
devaluations  in  the crawling  peg  episode (1983-85),  and  secondly,  using  a
market  defermined  rate in  the foreign  exchange  auction  (1985-87). What
distinguishes  the  two  episodes  is the  timing  of unification,  sequencing  of
accompanying  measures  of liberalization  and  portrayal  of commitment  to
liberalization  (i.e.  credibility  aspects). The episodes  may usefully  be
contrasted  and  lessons  drawn  from  the  aborted  auction  episode.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  A  detailed  narrative  tracing  the
development,  structure  and  operation  of  multiple  foreign  exchange  markets  is
contained  in  Section  II.  In  Sec*ton  III  the  link  between  the  premium  and  the
macro-economy  is  examined,  and  in  Sections  IV  and  V, a  model  for  the  premium
is  specified  and  estimated.  Section  VI  analyses  the  effects  of  the  premium  on
recorded  and  unrecorded  trade  flows  using  econometric  models  for  key  foreigntrade  aggregates,  and  In the  case  of unrecorded  imports,  data  was constructed
from  estimates  of overinvoicing  ratios  computed  in  this section.  Yn Sectlon
VII, the impact  of the  premium  on Lnflation  was eatimated  using a simple,
empirical  inflation  model$  also,  the  fiscal  lmpact  of the  premium,  *epecial'y
exchange  rats  unifLcation  a  la  Plnto  (op.  cit.),  is  estimated  and analyzed.
Finally,  Section  VIll  concludes.-6-
1.  *-  DEVELOPMNT  OF MULTIPLE MAURKT  FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE SN ZAMEZA
1.  A  brief survey of official currency arrangmeants Erom 1964.
Parity changes since 1964 are disc_ajed with reference to Table 2 (a).
At Independence in 1964, Zambia's currency was pegged to the pound rnd was
fully convertible.  The kwacha replaced the Zambian pound on 16th January,
_968, halving the official rate (to  KO.714/$ or Xi.7/ST) whilst retaining the
link to the pound sterling.  From 1964 until the early 19703 this fixed
exchange rate was ataintained. On 3rd December, 1971, the kwacha's ties to the
pound were severed and it was linked to the U.S. dollar at the rate KO.714/$.
This represented a devaluation, given the kwacha's appreciation againat the
dollar following a de facto devaluation of the American uni, on 15th August,
1971.  The gold content of the kwacha was reduced to 7.89 per cent on 22nd
December, which paralleled the U.S. dollar's devaluation of 18th Decemi-z,
thus leaving the official rate of exchange unchanged.  The kwacha did not
follow the February, 1973 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, and was realigned to
KO.643/$ on 15th February, based on an unchanged gold content.
Thereafter, with the increase in the dollar's value in consequence of
floating and the devaluation of various currencies, the kwacha  appreciated
against the currencies of all major trading partners  (save the Deutsche mark).
By mid-1976, the value of the nominal effective exchange rate (trade-weighted)
had risen over 25 per cent. On 8th July, 1976, ties with the dollar were
severed and the kwacha linked to the SDR at SDR1.08479 on a controlled,
floating basis, a de facto devaluation of 20 per cent.  This rate was devalued
by 10 per cent on 17th MArch, 1978 to SDRO.976311 and by a further 20 per cent
on 7th January, to SDRO.78125.  The link to the SDR was broken on 6th July,-7-
1983: a crawling peg based on a basket of currencies of maior trading
partners, rather than the basket determining the value  of the SDR, was
introduced.  A controlled devaluation was to be achieved of 1 per cent per
monvh; the rate was increased to 2.5 per cent in 184.
Dissatiefaction with the downw_rd rate of ad4untment and the
inefficiencies of the accompanying manual exchange allocation system led to
the adoption of a  foreign exchange auction system in October, 1985.  The rate
to the dollar on 3rd October was K2.2, reaching KS.01 in the first of the
weekly auctions, on 11th October, and K8.30 a year later on 11th October, 1986
in the 53rd auction.  Thereafter the rate declined sharply reaching K15.25 in
the 60th auction on 29th  November, 1986 (an  86 per cent depreciation of the
kwacha from the inception of the system).
From the 41st auction, new documentation was required to accompany bids,
and from the 43rd auction (2nd  August, 1986) a "Dutch Auction" replaced the
former system. 3 The Central Bank increased the amount of foreign exchange for
auction three-fold from 2nd August, but this policy was not oustainable. These
modification. failed to arrest the kwacha rate of depreciation.
Following riots on the Copperbelt and in Lusaka on 5th December, 1986,
with the rate at K14.92 in the 68th auction, the auction was temporarily
suspended (28th  January, 1987).  The rate was set at K9.00 . Thereafter six
auctions were held, beginning on the 28th March, 1987, under a  two-tier
auction system: an official window at !.9.00  was restricted to debt service,
essential imports and receipts of loans and grants, whilst the auction rate
was allowed to fluctuate between this rate and an upper ceiling of K15.00
3In  the "Dutch Auction", successful bidde..s  paid the full amount of their
bid regardless of the excess over the marginal bid, and this sum was
surrendered as government revenue.(this  restriction was abandoned after four weeks).  In the fifth  of theme
auctions on the 24th April, the kwacha rate fell to its lowest value, K21.02;
President Kaunda abolished the system on 1st May, after a final auction which
served only to allocate foreign exchange at the rate of K15.00.
From 5th May, a fixed rate of K8.00 was installed.  Requests for foreign
exchange were filed through the commercial banks, and allocation of foreign
exchange and isbue of import licenses decided simultaneously by a Foreign
Exchange Management Committee (FEMAC).  Non-traditional exporters were allowed
to retain 50 percent of their export earnings.  Free trade of title to the
reta'ned foreign exchange occurred at a premium on the official rate, but
required prior approval from FEMAC.  A third, legal foreign exchange market
was limited to larger non-traditional exporters and allowed the use of export
earnings to purchase Zambia's commercial (pipeline) debt at a discount on
international financial markets, then exchanged at the Bank of Zambia .'or
kwacha equal to the official rate times the face value of the debt inatrument.
A devaluation to X16.00 occurred in June, 1989, and a further devaluation to
K24.00 in December of that year.
As of February, 1990, a two-tier currency was re-introduced: an official
rate of exchange was initiated at K27.80/$, with the "market exchange rate" at
K40.00/S.  The Bank of Zambia sold foreign exchange through the First Window
(the official rate) under existing FEMAC procedures for imports, and purchased
all foreign exchange earned by ZCCM.  The Second Window operated at the market
rate and was used for those goods eligible for foreign exchange allocation
under the Open General License System (OGL).  The sources to fund this window
were non-traditional exports earnings and remittances received from donors.
only 10 per cent of Imports by volurtie  were eligible for OGL allocation at-9-
the inception of the system.  By the 31st March, 1991, most imports had been
transferred from the First to the Second Window, due to the gradual expansion
of the OGL to cover over 92 per cent of imports. Donor funding accounted for
54 per cent of the funding of the Second Window in 1990 and all of it in 1991.
In April, 1991, the rates were unified  at K58/$.
2.  The emergence of an unofficial market in foreign ex-hange.
The origins of Zambia's unofficial market in foreign exchange lie in the
control regime introduced and extended from Independence in 1964. Political
uncertainty in the decade of nationalizations post 1964 and deterioration of
the economy after the copper price shocks in the early 1970c provided further
incentives for capital flight.
At the dissolution of the Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-63),  Zambia had been the only country of the
three to relax exchange control restrictions imposed in 1961; however, these
liberalization measures were minor.  After a negative copper price shock in
1971, foreign exchange reserves were protected by tightening exchange
controls.  The overvalued exchange rate and foreign exchange controls created
excess demand in the market for foreign exchange, and thu parallel market
burgeoned.
Import licensing, originally devised to avoid congestion after the
closure of transport routes in the 19606, increasingly served to control
import levels.  In 1972, a restrictive import licensing system was introduced.
Certain categories of imports were banned, but capital and intermediate goods
imports were liberally licensed.  Import licensing was further tightened early
in 1975 following the precipitous decline in copper prices in 1974.  These- 10  -
measures continued to be strictly enforced until the liberalizing reforms of
the early 1980s.  Price controls had been applied from Independence to producer
prices of agricultural goods, the prices of "essential commodities" and some
parastatal company products.  Interest rate controls rendered real interest
rates negative from 1966 onwards, reaching below -10 percent between 1976 and
1980, and just preceding and following the auction.  Evasion of price and
trade controls by smuggling and misinvoicing, and consequences for the size of
the parallel market and the premium are discussed in the section on unrecorded
trade (Section  VI.2).
Various liberalization measures were implemented preceding the foreign
exchange auction and during its operation.  Most price controls were lifted in
December, 1982 and interest rates decontrolled late in 1985.  The trade
account was liberalized in October, 1985 concomitant with the floating of the
exchange rate.  External capital controls remained in place throughout the
nineteen month auction period.  Quasi-legalization of the black market was
also effected just prior to the auction with the introduction of export
retention schemes and "own funds" import licenses.' At its termination most
of the liberalizing measures were reversed.  The impact of the liberalizing
reforms on the premium is considered in Sections III and VI, and quantified in
Section VII.2.
3.  An evaluation of exchange rate policy in Zambia.
Six distinct exchange rate episodes have been identified for Zambia since
Independence in 1964 (see Table 1 (a)).  Exchange rate policy is analyzed with
'  Remittance of foreign exchange held abroad, or payment for imports of
goods and services out of funds held abroad, was allowed without restriction
or declaration as to the source of the funds.- 11  -
referencs to Figure 2 (a)  where nominal and real effective exchange rates for
the official rate are contrasted with the parallel real effective exchange
rate. 5 The official REER and NEER are set to 100 in 1980 while the parallel
REER is 60 in 198G to reflect the actual premium. The premium is the distance
between the two REER indices divided by the height of the parallel REER index.
As they move closer together, so the premium declines. The lower the parallel
REER and the higher the official REER indices, the higher the premium.  The
parallel rate is expected to display more short-term  volatility (this is
discussed in Section III), but discounting for the risk of illegality, may
serve as a proxy for a  market rate.  Thus the effective rates in Figure 2 (a)
may be used both descriptively to contrast the official REER and NEER, and to
assess the misalignment of the official REER from a "market rate" (parallel
REER).
In episode  1 (1964-1976Q2),  the exchange rate was fixed, initially to the
posind  sterling, and subsequently to the dollar. Exchange rate policy was
inactive in this period.  From 1971 the nominal rate became increasingly
overvalued, culminating in severance from the appreciating dollar. The
appreciation contributed to the deterioration in trade and current account
balances following the severe negative shock to copper prices in 1974 and rise
in  oil prices after 1973.  At the same time wage costs were rising and mining
5  The real effective exchange rate (REER) La the geometric average of
trade-weighted real exchange rates (RERi) ior the six major trading partners,
excluding South Africa, where RERi=NERi.CPI(Zambia)/CPIi ,  and NERi is the
nominal bilateral exchange rate in foreign currency per kwacha. The weights,
Wi, are import weights, based on partner-country recorded exports, to avoid
the misinvoicing bias (South  Africa does not record exports to Zambia).
Weights were redefined for 1968-72, 1973-77, 1978-82 and 1983-88. The CPI
rather than WPI was used as there are less likely to be definitional
discrepancies across countries (IFS, I.M.F.).- 12 -
profitability  falling  with increased  production  costs  and transport
dLfficultis.  The  overvalued  rate further  encouraged  capital  intensive
production  methods  towards  which  a bias  already  existed  given  the nature  of
tariff  policy.  Little  variation  is apparent  in  the  official  REER (inflation
averaged  6 per  cent for  1970-73)  save  for  a  muted  response  to the shocks  of
1971  and 1974.  The parallel  REER  is considerably  devalued  relative  to the
official  REER  and  tracks  the  terms  of trade  shocks  closely.
Progressive  devaluations  of the  kwacha  from 1976  until  the  auction  of
1985,  had  their  origins  in conditionality  associated  with International
Monetary  Fund  credit  agreements  with  the  government. Their  aim  was to redress
external  imbalance  in  the Zambian  economy  by enhancing  the competitiveness  and
profitability  of the  export  sector  and  encouraging  the  development  of new
exports  and import  substitutes.  The IMF's  involvement  with economic  policy
management  in Zambia  began  in 1971  with  the  negotiation  of a compensatory
financing  facility  for  SDRl9  million,  following  a  negative  copper  price  shock
and  the  flooding  of  Zambia's  second  largest  min.  Financial  flows  between
Zambia  and  the  IMF  have  since  been  considerable.  The  first  stand-by  agreement
was  negotiated  in 1973  covering  one  year and  was accompanied  by mild
conditions. The  post-1975  stabilization  programs  with the  IMF in 1976,  1978,
1981,  1983  and 1984,  with  the  exception  of the 1976  program,  all involved
higher  conditionality  (Ndulo  and  Sakala,  1986).7
In episode  2 (1976Q3-1983Q3)  the  rate  was pegged  to the SDR  and  two
6The  Rhodesian  border  with Zambia  was closed  in 1973  while  civil  war in
Angola  rendered  the  Benguela  Railway  route  unusable.
7  The  exchange  rate  components  of  the  agreements  are  summarized  in
Appendix  A.- 13 -
devaluations enacted, of 10 per cent in March, 1978 and a maxi-devaluation  in
January, 1983 of 20 per cent.  The NEER fell steadily until 1980, in tandem
with the official REER (inflation from 1976-80 averages 15 per cent, but
reached 10 per cent by 1980).  The parallel REER appreciated in 1979
reflecting the more realistic official REER and a positive terms of trade
shock in 1979/80.  In the aftermath of the 1979/80 copper boom, inflation rose
(it averaged 13 percent, 1980-83) and nominal rate depreciation was
insufficient to prevent misalignment of the official REER and NEER.  The
premium narrowed after 1979 as a function of devaluation, terms of trade
changes and increased foreign borrowing, reaching 30 percent in 1983.
The large devaluation of January, 1983 heralded a new exchange rate
episode, episode 3 (1983Q4-1985Q3),  where from mid-1983 the SDR link was
substituted by a basket of currencies of major trading partners and a crawling
peg employed.  Given high levels of inflation (averaging 26 percent from 1983-
85), the official REER continued to be overvalued, but the premium narrowed
reaching 40 percent in the month preceding the auction.
During 1984 and 1985 the importance of role of the exchange rate as an
economic policy instrument to induce the required structural adjustment
was increasingly emphasized, culminating in the foreign exchange auction
(episode 4 (1985Q4-1987Q2)).  The stated objectives of the foreLgn exchange
system and its accompanying measures (Bank  of Zambia, 1985) were to ensure the
responsiveness of the rate to changes in the demand for and supply of foreign
exchange and to provide foreign exchange in a timely manner.  Foreign exchange
would be attracted into the banking system while the parallel market would
have reduced importance. Subjectivity and the reliance on administrative
mechanisms in the allocation of foreign exchange would be eliminated. A larger- 14 -
volume  and  broader  range  of  exports  was  expected  to  result.  Further,  foreign
investment  would  be encouraged  by facllitatic if  the  remittance  of  dividends
and  profits.
The principal  feature  of the  weekly  foreign  exchange  auction  was that  the
auction  rate  applied  to all foreign  exchange  transactions. Predetermined
amounts  of foreign  exchange  were  allocated  outside  the systeme  but at the
auction  rate,  for  the  governmentls  imports,  ZCCM  and  non-traditional
exporters'  export  earnings  retention  quotas,  crude  oil imports  and related
port  charges  and IATA  payments  by Zambia  Airways. ' Foreign  exchange  for  all
other  imports  and service  payments,  including  the remittance  of profits,
dividends  and  transfers  were obtained  through  the  auction. The source  of
funds  for  the auction  was foreign  exchange  from  the  commercial  banks  arising
from  exports  of goods  and services  and  external  loans  and  grants. Wide
support  was  received  from  the international  community,  especially  the  World
Bank,  the IMF  and bilateral  donors.
Both  the  parallel  and  official  REER  fell  during  the auction,  and  the  gap
between  them  narrowed.9  Thus  the  premium  fell  to about  30 percent  in 1986,  a
level  considered  compatible  with  the  maintenance  of exchange  controls.
Nevertheless,  high levels  of inflation  (see  Section  7 on the  Pinto  Effect)
induced  overvaluation  in  the  official  REER.
The reversion  to a fixed  rate  with periodic  devaluations  for  over  two
years  after  the auction  constituted  episode  S (1987Q3-1989Q4)  with
persistently  high inflation,  the  official  REER  was progressively  more
s  Petroleum  and  IATA  payments  were included  in the  auction  from  February,
1986.
9  This  is seen  more clearly  with  monthly  data (discussed  in Section  7).- 15  -
overvalued  and  the  real  depreciation  gains  of the  auction  episode  were eroded.
Meanwhile  the  premium  soared,  exceeding  400  percent  in 1988.  This regime  was
superimposed  by an  official  multiple  rate  *ystem  from  early 1990,  which  was
unified  in the  first  quarter  of 1991.- 1r.  -
III.  TEE PARALLtL PR36U1  AND TEE NACRO-ECONOWY XN ZAMBIA: 1965-1989
The premium and the etock of black market currency are generally
considered to be jointly determined by the interaction of stock and flow
conditions in the black market for foreign exchange  (Dornbusch et al, 1983).
Portfolio balance considerations, given expected yields on domestically and
foreign-held assets, will govern the stock of assets willingly held; that is,
there is a level of the premium that w!'l establish stock equilibrium.
Current and expected changes in econom - jolicy  or changes in exogenous
variables, such as terms of trade and foreign aid, will affect the portfolio
composition through the wealth effect.  Flow considerations are especially
emphasized in black market models: the level of the premium will influence the
flows into and out of foreign currency by altering profit opportunities for
smuggling, the faked invoicing of trade, tourism and the remittances of
migrants.  Factors affecting flow conditions, and therefore the spread,
include trade controls and the risks and costs of engaging in illicit
activity.
In the Introduction, the considerable changes seen in the annual black
market premium were briefly discussed with reference to Figure 1. Statistics
for the premium by exchange rate episode (Table 1 (b)) showed a decline in the
mean premium until episode 5, while variability tended to increase with the
exception of the auction perlod.
Examination of monthly data organized by exchange rate episode in Figure
3 (a) shows that some periods have experienced more volatility than others.
The increased variability reflects the short-run impact of "news" on the
premium.  The black market is integrated with forward looking asset markets so
that the assumption of rational expectations in conjunction with portfolio- 17  -
decisions means that expectations about political events and changes in
economic policy may be apparent in the premium before they occur, while
political and economic shocks have an immediate impact.  Whether this
variation  in  the  premium  will  be  positive  or  negative  depends  upon  the  change
induced or expected to be induced in the private sectors' desired holdings of
foreign exchange.  Dornbusch et al (1983) find expectations of major
devaluations, in addition to variables capturing changes in asset stocks and
the flow of 2oreign exchange, to be significant in explaining the Brazilian
black market premium, while politics and interest rates were major
determinants of the Argentinian premium (Dornbusch and Moura Silva, 1987).
In the short-run, portfolio considerations and expectations are likely to
be  the  major  determinants  of  the  premium.  The  long-run  steady  state  premium
has  been  shown  in  models  employing  the  above  theoretical  framework  to  depend
on  such  fundamentals  ae the  terms  of  trade,  the budget deficit, capital flows
and the trade regime (see for example Lizondo (1987b),  Pinto (1988a)  and
Section V of this paper).
In what follows, first, the Zambian experience is considered in the light
of the above cited literature. Linkages between the premium and the
macro-economy  are examined  for  each  exchange  rate  episode,  with  recourse  to
macroeconomic  indicators  in  Table  3 (a) and monthly premium trends in Figure 3
(a).
Secondly, we specify and estimate a simple monthly model of expectation
of future devaluation, drawing on the discussion of episodes.  This model
accommodates the reactions to anticipated economic policy as well as to
political and economic events, and can be used to study the evidence on the
determinants of expectations in Zambia.  Furthermore, if expectations of- 18 -
future  devaluations  are  important  for  the  determination  of  the  premium  and  our
model  of  expectation  is  correctly  specified,  the  derived  series  of  expected
devaluation  should  closely  approximate  the  actual  behavior  of  the  premium.
1  *  acroeconoamic  linkag  e  by  excange  rate  opisode.
1.1  Eoiggde I: 1964-197602
Zambia  attained  independence  from  Britain  in 1964,  the first  year  of
the  copper  boom,  at the  dissolution  of the  Wederation  of Northern  Rhodesia,
Southern  Rhodesia  and  Nyasaland  (1953-63).  A very small  industrial  base  was
inherited,  with  manufacturing  contributing  les  than 7  per cent  of GDP and  10
per  cent  of formal  sector  employment  in 1964.  Agriculture  contributed  12  per
cent  of GDP in 1964,  due largely  to the  output  of the 1200-1300  expatriate,
commercial  farms  along  the line  of rail  to the copper  belt,  most agriculture
being  rural  and  subsistence-based.  Dominant  in the  economy  from  the 1920s  was
the  copper  sector,  owned  and  managed  by foreign  interests  and  providing  the
major  impetus  for  the  development  and  settlement  of the  economy. At
Independence  copper  contributed  40 per  cent  of  GDP,  20 per  cent of formal
sector  employment,  90  per  cent  of  goods  exports  and  over  60  per  cent  of  tax
revenues.
Zambia's  early  economic  development  was  characterized  by an increasing
role for  government  in  the  economy  and  the  imposition  of economic  controls.
The  origin  of these  controls  lies  in the  practical  implementation  of the
Zambian  philosophy  of "Humanium",  a  version  of African  Socialism  developed  in
the  pre- Independence  political  struggle  by Kaunda  and  the  United  National
Independence  Party (articulated  ln Kaunda  (1974)). It  was considered  a
political  necessity  to address  pre-Independence  health  and education  (racial)- 19  -
differentials and to provide housing, to "Zambianise" employment, and gain
from expatriates economic :ontrol of agriculture, mining and industry,
creating Zambian entrepreneurs. Diversification of the economy away from
copper was accorded priority, a long-held view, the first allusione to which
were in the 1930. (King (1987)).  Agricultural and industrial development were
therefore emphasized.
The 1968 Mulungushi Reforms expanded the government holding company for
industry, finance and real estate by means of a 51 per cent state
participation in 26 existing private enterprises, and it grew rapidly
thereafter due to further take-overs and new investment.  In 1976, the public
share in  manufacturing was over 50 per cent.  Nationalization of the two major
mining companies (a 51 per cent equity share) followed in 1969 with the
compensatory issue of 6 per cent bonds, unconditionally guaranteed by the
government and serviced out of dividends.  The financial sector proved
unamenable to nationalization, but various state financial intermediaries have
since been created.  State involvement in agriculture was via State farms and
subsidized statutory monopolies dealing with the largest marketed trade.
Substantial subsidies and loans  were extended to parastatAls while food
subsidies guaranteed a quiescent urban population (politically Important,
comprising 50 per cent of the population).  Economic controls were introduced
and steadily extended post Independence,  particularly after the first negative
copper price shocks of the early 19709.  These included interest rate
controls, wage controls, price controls in agriculture and industry, exchange
controls and quantitative restrictions on trade.
The pattern of copper prices from 1950 to 1990 is shown in Figure 3 (b).
A positive shock to copper prices from 1964 induced a trade surplus. Foreign- 20 -
reserves were accumulated reaching a maximum in 1970 while capital inflow was
modest.  Government savings were positive until 1970 and amounted to about a
third of national savings.  Public sector capital and current expenditures
rose strongly in line with the ambitious First National Development Plan
(1964-71), but the budgetary position was sustainable until 1970, given high
mineral revenues.
From 1965-76 real income grew at an annual average rate of 2.4 per cent.
The aggregate figure reflects a decline in mining growth over the period due
to rising costs and transport difficulties (-2  per cent), and slow growth in
transport and communications and construction ((1.8  per cent and 1.4 per cent,
respectively).
Although emphasis had been given to agricultural development, output
growth was low with continued reliance on Imported food and agricultural raw
materials.  The domestic terms of trade were against agriculture with producer
prices set below border prices.  Services expanded rapidly at 6.7 per cent
with government demand while the manufacturing sector achieved the highest
rate of growth from a low base at 7.7 per cent.  However, wage increases, low
interest rates, generous investment and depreciation allowances, low tariffs
on capital goods and an over-valued exchange rate encouraged an
import-substituting, capital intensive mode of production.  By 1976, the
manufacturing sector received almoot 40 per cent of visible imports of which
about 15 per cent were capital imports.
Thus despite an increasing government role and stated commitment tc
diversification, the negative copper price shock in 1974 impinged upon an
economy still highly dependent upon copper (see Table 3 (b)).  The first
negative shocks of the early 1970s had induced balance of payments and budget- 21 -
crises. The  copp r  price  recovered  from  1973,  but after  the  crash Ln  mid-1974
persistent  budget  and  trade  deficits  were  the  norm.  Theme  were sustained  by
decumulation  of reserves,  borrowing  arl  the  appreciation  of the currency.
Zambia's  link  with  the  I.M.F.  was  initiated  with extended  facility  agreements
in 1971-72  followed  by a standby  agreement  in 1973.  Zambian  borrowing
appeared  to be pro-cyclical  with  nominal  copper  pricess  borrowing  was heavy  in
the 1970-75  period  while  Zambia  wac  rationed  by creditors  during  1976-77. The
imposition  of more  stringent  in-port  and  exchange  controls  was  discussed  in
Section  11.2.
Black  market  rates  are  available  from  mid-1970  (averages  of monthly
rates). The  trends  for  misinvoicing  in  Tables  6 (b)  and (c),  however,  suggest
considerable  over-invoicing  from  1964.  The  premium  from  1964-70  is likely  to
reflect  this  increased  de'uand  for  foreign  assets  during  the  copper  boom  as
well  as the  effects  of stringent  exchange  controls  and  political  uncertainty
in  the first  decade  after  Independence.  The  flow  of illegal  foreign  exchange
is responsive  to the  terms  of trade,  inducing  a rise  in  the premium  when the
terms  of trade  deteriorate. In 1971  following  a negative  terms  of trade  shock
the level  of the  premium  was over  50  per  cont.  Thereafter  it  responded
appreciably  to changes  in  the  terms  of trade,  falling  with the  1972-74
improvement  and rising  after  the 1974  crash. From 1973  the  exchange  rate
fixed  to an  appreciating  dollar  became  increasingly  over-valued  which
exacerbated  the  premiumse  sharp  rise  to a  maximum  in 1977,  only  exceeded  in
the late  1980s  after  the  auction.- 22  -
1.2  Eoisode 2: 197603-198303
In the aftermath  of the precipitous decline in copper prices from 1974,
the government entered into several conditional credit agroements with the
I.M.F.  In line with the 1976-77 I.M.F. stand-by facility the tax base was
altered, wages were frozen, subsidies cut by 30 per cent and development
expenditure decreased by a  third.  The budget deficit was reduced but
three-quarters of it was funded domestically, which added to inflationary
pressures, as evidenced in Table 3 (a).  With a highly restrictive import
policy and a small rise in the price of copper the current account balance
showed some improvement.  Thereafter the pattern of large budget and trade
deficits continued, mitigated only by the rise in copper prices from 1979.
The 1978-80 I.M.F. stand-by facility reduced credit and inflationary
pressures,  but  crowded  out  the  private  sector,  most  credit  being  absorbed  by
the  government  and  mining  companies.  From 1975,  there  was  little  cap.tal
inflow, but payments arrears built up  (by  1980  amounting  to  $600  million)  and
net foreign assets declined.  Foreign reserves had by thie time largely been
eroded.  The foreign exchange constraints forced a contraction in the
manufacturing  sector,  services  declined  with  government  demand  and  agriculture
continued  to  stagnate.  Although a 1981-83  extended  facillty  was  successful  in
reducing the budget deficit in 1981, it became inoperative in 1982, in which
year the attempt to maintain government services and employment in the face of
falling revenue induced a deficit of 18 per cent of GDP.  The payments deficlt
was financed mainly by the accumulation of arrears.
The black market premium exhibits two phases of behavior within this
episode: in the first, until mid-1979, the level remains on average above 150
percent; In the second, the premium falls by 70 percent and thereafter- 23 -
gradually declines, with decreased volatility.  The first phase is
characterized by sharp rises in inflation and large budget deficits.  Zambia
was rationed by foreign creditors, reserves were eroded and the terms of trade
continued to decline.  Tight import and foreign exchange controls compounded
these  effects  in  keeping the premium high.  The second phase begins with a
recovery of the copper price in 1979, resulting in a relaxation of borrowing
constraints.  More reotrictive macroeconomic policies were peraued which
together with inflows of foreign borrowing sustained the low level of the
premium, even when copper prices fell in 1981 (though  volatility briefly
increased).  Exchange rate policy was passive during the entire period, save
for two devaluations.
The devaluation of March, 1978 has a negligible impact but in January,
1983 a maxi-devaluation of 20 per cent provides a classic instance of
expectational  response  in  the  premium  (this  is  the  only  example  of  a  one-off
maxi-devaluation  throughout).  The  theoretically predicted time path for the
adjustment  of  the  black market to current expectations of a future devaluation
of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  shown  in  Figure  3  (c)  (Dornbusch  et  al
(1983)).  Speculators  expect  that  in  the  long-run  a  convergence  to  the  initial
steady state level of the premium will ensue; this would necessitate a future
depreciation of the black market rate.  The profit opportunities this presents
induces an immediate increase in the demand for foreign exchange and hence a
jump in the premium from A to A'.  Thereafter, the premium rises over time to
A'', in combination with a growing stock of foreign currency.  When the
official devaluation is realized, an immediate fall in premium from A'' to
A''' occurs, due entirely to the fall in the official rate.  T,&e  black rate
does not alter concomitantly with the official rate since this change was- 24 -
anticipated in the initial jump to A'.  Thereafter, the transitory
accumulation of foreign currency is gradually depleted, and the premium
returns to its initial steady - state level.
The behavior of the premium in Zambia around 1983 is shown in Figure  3
(c)  to follow the theoretically predicted path.  The black market rate did not
alter at the time of the devaluation, but depreciated subsequently.
The derived expected devaluation series covering the period before and
after the January 1983 devaluation is depicted in Figure 3 (e) (discussed in
III.d).  It is noteworthy that both series confirm the prediction of the
theoretical model.  This supports two assertions mentioned at the beginning of
this section.  First, expectations are important as determinant of the free
rate premium; and secondly, our empirical model of expectation seems to be
well specified, at least for the period in question. '°  The non-normal
distribution of the premium suggested by such speculative responses is
discussed further in Section V.
1.3  Episode 3: 198304-198503
This episode  coincides with the onset of liberalizing reforms in
connection with the 1983-84 IMF stand-by agreement, later intensified in the
auction period. Following the January 1983 devaluation more emphasis was
placed on active exchange rate policy to facilitate balance of payments
adjustments.  The Fund recommended delinkage from the SDR, given that its
value is determined by a basket of currencies with little relevance for
Zambia's trading patterns.  A mechanism for gradual, systemative exchange rate
"3This  demonstration has employed monthly black market rates which
therefore embody lags in reaction time. They were derived from Pick's Currency
Yearbook, concerning which data  cautionary comments have already been made.- 25  -
adjustment was installed.  Most of the performance criteria under the program
-were  met.  The budget deficit was reduced from 19 to 8 per cent of GDP, in
particular by cutting subsidies and personal emoluments.  However GDP
continued to decline and inflation began to accelerate.  The final purchase in
the agreement was disallowed due to postponement of paying arrears.  Most
measures associated with the stand-by facility of 1984-86 were implemented.
However, GDP fell by 2.7 per cent and inflation rose above 20 per cent.  The
facility was inactive from September, 1984 when criteria for the reduction of
external payments arrears were not met, and it was canceled in 1986.
The black market premium showed a steady fall in this period from 30 per
cent  to  about  17  per  cent  in  September,  1984.  An  instance  of  the  short-term
response  of  the  premium  to  news  is  provided  by  the  increase  of  10-fold  on
termination  of  the  IMF program.  The  steady  decline  persisted  after  this  jump,
but  from  the  higher  level  and at a reduced rate, despite the increased rate of
crawl.
1.4  Evisode  4:  198504-198702
As  Figure  8  (a) and Table 1  (b)  show,  the auction period displays an
increased volatility in  the premium together with a spectacular trough in
April, 1987.  The auction raises a  number of interesting issues for the
analysis of the role of the black market premium.  These include the extent to
which unification was achieved and the rate which ensued, the short-run impact
of shocks and signals on the premium, and finally, the fiscal effects of the
unification  (Pinto, 1987).
Some models predict that anticipation of unification will induce the
parallel rate to move to the level expected to obtain on unification.  This- 26 -
appears to hold for Zambia, with overshooting; Figure 3 (d) shows the extent
to which depreciation of the parallel rate tracked the official rate around
the auction episode.  The  premium follows a downward trend within the first
quarter of the auction.  Thereafter short-run influences shape its path.
An important aspect of expectations formulation in the context of
structural adjustment is the private sectors' assessment of the sustainability
of liberalization measures and the government's commitment to them.  These
issues of credibility have increasingly been emphasized (Calvo, 1987).  Sachs
(1989) further suggests that past experience of aborted liberalization
attempts makes players particularly sensitive to official signals of
commitment  and credibility.
Zambia's foreign exchange auction provides an interesting illustration of
these phenomena.  During the auction there were several mechanisms for the
transmission of official signals.  The amount of foreign exchange put up for
auction each week was a visible official control variable: fluctuations
induced increasing excesses of dollars requested over those allocated  (see
Appendix Table A.3(a)).  The degree and nature of intervention in the running
of the auction affected credibility.  Intervention included disqualification
of bids, more stringent documentation requirements, suspension temporarily or
permanently of the auction and alteration of the type of auction system.
Table 3 (c) details shocks and signals influencing the black market
premium during the nineteen month auction period. The short-run influence of
shocks and signals appear to dominate the behavior of the premium during this
period, which also shows sensitivity to "news" about the auction.  Official
actions signalling commitment and sustainability decrease the premium, and
visa  versa.  The response to political news is evident on Dr. Chivuno's- 27  -
appointment  an  Governor  of  the  Central  Banks  he  was  known  to  be opposed  to the
auction.  Efficiency in implementing the system would be observed at the
micro-levelt the large back-log in allocated dollars that built up from
August, 1986 was not sustainable (disbursement delays averaged 10 weeks and
were not cleared until May, 1987) and the premium is seen to rise thereafter.
The implication of speculative responses on the part of firms to official
signals was further to impair economic sustainability of the liberalization.
Visible speculative behavior implied an uncertain macro-economic environment
which decreased business confidence. very rapid devaluation in the final
stages, due to speculation by firms, actually rendered the premium negative.
With an imminent end to the auction and a clamp-down on illegal activity in
prospect, the risk aspect of black market activity is revealed in a deficit
wLth respect to the official rate being paid in kwacha for the purchase of
dollars. This phenomenon was observed for Brazil (Dornbusch et al, 1983)."1
The auction can be divided into  two phases, a stable period  from its
inception to August, 1986, and an unstable period thereafter, until its demise
in April, 1987.  This division is based on whether or not there is an
appropriate response in the official exchange rate to the quantity of dollars
allocated.  Although the advent of Chivuno saw a trebling of allocated
dollars, a  perverse response in the exchange rate can only be observed from
Auction 47, on the last day of  August (see  Appendix A.3(a)).  The fiscal
position in these two phases of the auction is analyzed in Section 7.2.
"We hope in the future to study the impact on the premium of signals and
speculative  responses  during  the  auction  period  in  the  context  of  a  rigorous
empirical model using weekly auction data.- 28  -
2 *  Model  of  Expected Devaluation
The  derivation  of  a  forecast  equation  for  expectations  of  future
devaluation  starts  with  the  following  assumed  government  reaction  function:
r1
(3  )  Alog  E0  - bo  +  E  b1L  log  (RERb/RERO)t_i
t+l  Lao
where
E P  0p
RE%a  b  /p  and  RER  0  p
This reaction  function  implies  that if  the  official  real  exchange  rate
RERb  was  overvalued  (smaller)  relative  to the  black  market  real  exchange  rate
there  will  be a pressure  on the  authorities  to devalue.  Note that  given  the
particular  definitions  of the real  exchange  rates  adopted,  the reaction
function  is  actually  governed  by previous  periods'  levels  of the premium
(since  RERb/RER.  - q).
Now  we also  assume  that  agents  in  the economy  know  this  reaction  function
and  that this  influences  their  considerations;  they  also  take into
consideration  the record  of previous  devaluations  and  the  history  of monetary
emissions. Furthermore,  given  the  various  regime  shifts  over  the period
considered  (see  above)  a set  of dummy  variables  is included  to account  for
this  effect  on expectations.  Based  on this,  the following  linear  forecast
equation  is  used  to generate  expectations:- 29  -
r1
(3.2)  Alog Eo  0  bo +  E b  i  log (RERb/RERO)ti
t+1  i-0
r  ~~~r  r
+  E 2 b  log E0 + E b3  Alog "t_L +$  b 4 i  RSHtL
imo  2  t-i  i-0 i=  4  -
+ a t+l
where M is  the  stock of broad domestic money, RSH stands for regime  shifts,
and  c is  a  stationary  disturbance  term.
The  above  model  was  estimated  using  monthly  Zambian  data  for  the  period
Jan.1980 to June 1987.  The results of the estimation is contained in equation
(3.2') below.
(3.2')  AlogE, 011=  -2.97  .0.17l0gqt-a
(-2.73)  (1.80)
-0.  18  1 ogE0 ,
(2.38)




-0.23  JtIY6  +0.25SEP86
(-1.71)  (1.82)




R2  =  0.63,  R2 =  0.58,DW  =  2.11
where  t-statistics  are  in  parentheses  and  the method of estimation is OLS.- 30 -
The results show significant effects for the role of the authorities
reaction to past overvaluation of the official real rate relative to the free
real rate given by log REPR  - log REN  (or simply log q).  This factor however,
only takes effect with a lag.  Overvaluation two months earlier has a positive
effect on expected devaluation.  The effect of expansive fiscal or monetary
policy is reflected by the statistically significant and appreciable positive
coefficient of the log of the stock of nominal broad domestic money.  This
effect is more immediate than that of real overvaluation currently influencing
expectations of next period devaluation.  This evidence shows the importance
of fiscal and monetary policy in shaping agents' expectation about future
devaluations.
The model also shows, as expected, that starting from an initial
conditiorn  of high official exchange rate is likely to reduce expectations of
future devaluations.  This is reflected by the large negative and
statistically significant elasticity obtained for  logE,_  in the model.
The remaining influences on the model are accounted for by a variety of past
economic and political events (see  Table 3 (c)).  In all cases the obtained
results are consistent with the interpretation of the model and the
discussions of the various episodes in ths coming sections.
In January, 1983 a maxi-devaluation was effected which would of course
reduce expectations of an immediate future devaluation.  The dummy proves to
be slightly significant, given the degrees of feedom,  and displays the
expected negative sign.
All the other dummies serve to capture signals of credibility in the
course of the auction episode.  The auction was initiated in October, 1985.- 31  -
In  the  first  of  the  weekly  auctions,  the  rate  fell  from  K2.2  to  K5.O1/$  and
thereafter  stability  was  maintained  Ln the  rate,  generating  no  expectation  of
an  immediate  devaluation.
From  June,  1986  weekly  bids  were  published  in  an  effort  to  stabilize  the
auction,  a  credibility  signal  likely  to  decrease  speculation.  But  from
September,  1986,  after  the institution  of  a  'Dutch  Auction',  the  foreign
exchange  pipeline  began  to  build  up,  indicating  possible  unsustainability  of
the  auction  and  inducing  speculation.  In  January,  1987  after  riots  on  the
Copper  Belt,  the  auction  was  suspended  for  nine  weeks.  Expectations  of
devaluation  were  clearly  negative;  this  was  dramatically  reversed  in  March,
1987,  when  a  two-tier  auction  was  reinstated.  In  April,  1987  just  prior  to
the  abolition  of  the  auction  experiment,  tremendous  speculation  drove  down  the
rate  and  repressive  reaction  from  the  authorities  actually  rendered  the
premium  negative.  A  fixed  rate  was again  in  prospect.- 32 -
IV  . A MODEL  OP THE  PARALLEL  PREMIUM
The preliminary analysis presented above indicate that the parallel
market premium in Zambia is influenced by (or jointly determined with) a
variety of factors including macroeconomlc and trade policies, agents
expectations, as well as exogenous determinants such as TOT and foreign aid.' 2
In this section we develop first a basic model of dual exchange rates in
which the premium will be specified as a function of the stock of money, and
the uncovered interest parity differential, reflecting the asset market
condition;  as well as the flow determinants which include the official real
exchange rate (E,/PN),  permanent real wealth (or stock of money), and the
parameters of trade policy.
This basic model which does not endogenize the official RER is more
suited for estimation with finely sampled data such as monthly data.  The main
emphasis in such estimation should be to distinguish the long-run flow
determinants of the premium from the short-run (dynamic) asset market
influences.  In this case a formal analysis of stationary and cointegration
can be quite useful, because it will resolve the problem of endogeniety and
provide a justification for an error-currection dynamic framework --  which
allows the distinction between short-run and long-run effect.
The second objective of th's section is to extend the basic model by
endogenizing REP,  as a function of its fundamentals as well as allowing for
other exogenous factors such as foreign aid.  This extended model will be
estimated in section (V)  using annual data.  In this model the obvious
12 It is also evident that in the very short run a combination of market
thinness and agents reactions to frequently changing policies might have
caused the premium to follow a skewed or non-stationary process  (see appendix
table A.5(a)).- 33 -
emphasis will be on a more detailed view of the determinants of the premium.
1.  The Basic Model
We assume a dual exchange rate system where an officially sanctioned
share, z, of total exports, are required to be surrendered to the authorities
at the official rate.  Also a  share of imports, v, of total private sector
imports, I, is allowed through the official market at the rate E,  along with
the exogenously given government imports  I..  The rest of the commercial
transactions are settled at the black (free)  market according to the freely
floating dual rate, Eb.  The effectiveness of the above arrangements depende
on the extent of leakages between the two markets which in turn depends on the
tax adjusted level of the premium  (q  =  g-  =  ,  and enforcement
efforts, 
1 ENF*
Therefore we define export smuggling and under-invoicing ratio,  ,
relative to the z exports (zX)  as:
(4.1)  ox =x  (1-t I  1ENF)' 3
x
(+)  (-)
As for imports we abstract from smuggling and concentrate on *lodelling
'where l  is an indicator function in V.- 34 -
the  over-invoicing  ratio  of  offLcial  imports  (vl),  Ot14
(4.2)  r  a  0I (t'  -AN-  )
(+)  (-)
Equatlon  (4.1)  sets  an arbltrage  conditLon  for  the  decision  to smuggle
or under-Lnvolce  exports  accordlng  to the zxc,ss  of Eb over  tho tax adjusted
nominal  official  rate  E0(1-t).  In  eq. (4.2)  also,  the  hlgher  tha ratio
Eb/Ed(l+t 1) the  hLgher  the LncentLve  to over-invoice  the  set  of $mports  (vi)
allowed  through  the  offlcial  rarket. On the  other  hand  enforcement  efforts
will raise  the  cost of amuggllng  or mis-invoicing  and  therefore  both  0k  and  #I
will  decllne  as a  result  of intensified  enforcement  efforts.
Key  relative  price.  needed  for  the specification  of total  private  sector
exports,  x, and imports,  I, are  the  real  exchange  rates  for  exports  and
imports, which we define as follows:
(4.3)  RER,  p  [8Z.*xeb  +  (1-Z)  (1-tX)  Eb + Z  (1-*x)  (1-tC))E 0
PM 1
=  . P,  [z1 z  x  (l-t)  (1-tx) q  + Z  (3-#x)  (1-tx)]
whers, e.,  the officLal RER L  equal to  so
PM'
Similarly  RER,  is  given  by:
- (official  over invoiced  imports/actual  official  imports)  - 1.- 35  -
(4.4)  PER,  PI.  1[(bz+)  V'eO(1+ty+tOR) +  (1-V)  Eb  (1+t)]  /PN
- eo,  *  Pr'  f  (40+2+)  v(l+t,+C,,,)  +  (1-V)  (1  |  -r)  q]
where  tQg  is  the implicit  tax  rate  that  reflects  scarcity  rent  in imports
channeled  through  the  official  market. Now  write total  exports  as a positive
function  of RER 1:
(4.  5)  -X = X(RERX)
Next  we defLne  total  private  imports,
(4.6)  1 =  (RZ,  M + EbF  )
VEO +  ( 1 -V)  Eb (-_)  (.0.)
where  M+E?F  stands  for  private  sector  financial  wealth  with  M being  the stock
of domestic  money,  and  F the stock  of foreign  assets  held  by the  private
sector. Nominal  wealth  is  deflated  by vEZ  (l-v)Eb,  the  average  unit  cost  of
imports.
Now  we state  the  following  flow  equil±brium  condit.iono  of the  model:
(4.7)  F[4xZ+(1-Z)]  X  + v'*I  -(1-v)  I- 36  -
(4.8)  A  =  (X-I)  - *+  NkF
where  is the change in official reserves, and the last term in the right
hand side of (4.8) is official net capital flows.
The second part of the model is a portfolio equilibrium condition
which gives the relati%e stock of foreign and domestic monies as a function of
the uncovered interest parity differential.  Letting  X+,  denote conditional
expectation of X,+ conditional on information available at time t, the
portfolio balance condition can be stated as:
me.9  - =  g(iet+Alog  Eb,.l  it)  g-<° M49  C+EbFt 
We also  have
(4.10)  * Alog  Eb,.,  =rAlog  qt.1 +*Alog  EHoc.
where  A  Is  the  difference  operator.  Expectations of future devaluations are
based on the expectations model given in equation (3.2) of section III above.
As we mentioned in section III this model accounts for the impact on
exrectation of past economic policy as well as past economic and political
events.
By imposing the flow equilibrium condition on the unreported current
account equation (i.e.  =0  in (4.7)),  we obtain the following expression- 37 -
for the stationary level of F.
(4.11)  F  = F  (RERX, RERy,  m,  q,  tx,  t;  z,  v.  1 No)  '
(+)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (+)(+)  (?  (?) (-)
where  m  =  E-  is the stock of real domestic money, clearly for given values
EO
of the right hand side (especially (RER,,  RER,  and m), equation  (4.11) is a
steady state solution for F that provides a long-run (non-dynamic) expression
for the premium depending on the fundamentals of the flow equilibrium
condition.
Equation (4.9)  on the other hand is a dynamic specification that governs
the  dy.amics  of  the  premium,  and  hence  its  short-run  determination.  Putting
(4.11) in (4.9) and using (4.10),  we  obtain  the  following  basic model of the
premium  in  a  linear  logarithmic  form:
log  qe  -1jog  qte  =  do+b  (it,  +,Alog  EO,-it)
+82  log  mt  - 63 log  RERX,  -64  log  fiREr
(4.12)
+  65  log  (l-tx)  t  +66  log(1+  t 1 )  t
+  87  l.MWV.8j
This equation provides a basis for estimating a basic cointegrated
relationship for the premium." I7  Specifically, if a forward-looking
solution of this martingale exists, and if the variables involved (or a subset
of them) are cointegrated, then a cointegrated specification and a
"  Actually the sign on RER,  is ambiguous, unless v *  >  1-v (see equation
4.7).
16  Refer to the discussion in the second paragraph of this section.
17 The potential endogeneity of RERX,  RER,  and m,  for example, is not a
problem under individual nonstationarity and cointegration.- 38  -
corresponding  error-correction  dynamic  equation  can  be  obtained  as  well.
2.  SndAoenizinathe  URR
As we mentioned  above,  equation  (4.12)  contains  at least  four  endogenous
variablecs  the  premium,  q; the  real  exchange  rates,  REP,  and  RER; the stock  of
money,  ml and  the  domestic  interest  rate,  i.  In this subsection,  we will
endogenize  the real  exchange  rates  by deriving  an expression  for the  real
rates  by solving  for  the  equilibrium  condition  in the  nontraded  goods
market.  I
Following  Rodriguez  (1989,  1991),  the internal  balance  condition  can  be
stated  as follows:
(4.13)  DN  (pg,  Px  PN) .A  - SN(pN,  Pz,  PX)  '  0
+)  (+)  ()  (+)  (  (  )
"We  abstract  here from  the  potential  endogeniety  problems  of m and L;  but
under  monetary  rule  A=O  for  example,  the steady  state  level  of m, is given
by  M=  g-t  where  7:  is  the  steady  state  rate of crawl  of the o"icial
exchange  rate,  hence  the steady  state  stock  of money  does not  depend  on q (see
Elbadawi  :1991)  for  details). Regarding  the interest  rate,  no data  on the
potentially  endogenous  market  determined  rate is available  for  Zambia  in  a
consistent  basis  over  the  period  considered;  we are  therefore  left  with  the
official  rate  which  can  be considered  predetermined,  at least  for  the  period
before  the auction. This,  however,  may call  into  question  the suitability  of
the  official  rate for  reflecting  the  opportunity  cost  of holding  foreign  money
as required  in specification  (4.9).- 39  -
where  A is  nominal  absorption,  Y is  nominal  income , and  the  definitLon  of Pm
is  extended  here  to include  a  weighted  average  of purely  domestic  goods,  as
well  as of those  imported  items  where  scarcity  rent (i.e.  t1 o) exists.
This leaves  P,  and  PI to be determined  by foreign  prices,  exchange  rates  and
explicit  taxes. Now abstracting  from  misinvoicing  we can state  the following
two  basic  definitions  for  P3 and  P,.
(4.14)  P. = PI  (1-Z)  (1-tX)Eb  + Z(1-t:tx)  Eol
(4.15)  p  . pz  (1-V)  (1+td)  Eb + V (l+t 1 )  ol
Now imposing  the  nominal  price  homogeneity  condition  on  the  hom  good
equilibrium  condition  (4.13),  we  obtaint
DN(.  1PZJ  [5Px]  pz  (1  +  td)
(4.16)
where  td  =  is  the  resource  balance  deficit  normalized  by GDP.
The  solution  of  (4.16'  and  definition  (4.14)  and  (4.15)  lead  to  the
following expressions for PX/PN  and P,/PM:- 40 -
(4.17 )  pR  pN  -xp  td  TN  OX  |.  t,,,  tr,  v,  z,  q  td 
(  I'r  (_)  (_)  (+)  (-)  (?)  (  )
(4.  18) fx  _  PX fX  P  X'*z,  ' i4. 18  p  =  $  s,td  |  p  t  p  ,  #t,  tz,  v,  z,  g  td 
From  the definitions  of RERx  and  RERN  in (4.3)  and (4.4)  and from  equations
(4.14)  and (4.15)  that  give the  expressions  for  Px  and P 1, we can  define  RERx
and  RER,  in the  following  generic  forms:
(4.19)  RRx  n-' gx  (z, 1.Q.?
(4.20)  1 pm  - V,  low
(?)  (?)
Now let  us define  an  economy  wide  real  exchange  rate  as a  weighted  geometric
average  of RERx  and  RER,
(4.21)  RER  RER  RERZ  *  hf  (z  P)  ()  gPN)
where  0 < a <  1 is  the  share  of exports  in  traded  goods.
Flnally  using (4.17)  and (4.18)  in (4.21)  we can obtain  the reduced  form- 41 -
for  RERt
(4.22)  RER  '  RER  PX'*  I-t=x  4t  q,  td;  v,  z,  1lw
P(  ()  (-)  M)
where  we assumed  the  more  direct  offeet  of  ;. on RER  through  px  to be
stronger  than lts  influence  through  -'  ,  but in general  the  coefficient  of
PM
TOT could  not  be signed  apriori. Now substituting  (4.21)  and (4.22)  in (4.12)
gives  the following  extended  expression  for  the  premium  presented  in equation
(4.23)  below. The  right  hand  side  of the specification  includes  net capital
flow  term NKP.  NRK  enters  into  (4.23)  directly  through  the  official  balance
effect  (equation  (4.8)),  and  as a  proxy for  the  total  current  account  deficit
GDP  ratio (td).- 42  -
log  qe-A8log  qe. 1 - 60  +  81  (it  +tAlog  Eot4,  - it)
+ 62  log  mt  + 83  log  (1-tx)  t
+ 8,  log  (1+t.)  c  - a5 NKFt
(4.23)  - 6,  (a.  + a,  log  ] +  aa  log  (1-t.)  c
- a3  log  (l+tZ)  t  -a4  eF  +  51  (  V,  Z,  )  )
(?)  (?)  (?)
log  q,  - 1,log  qe, - YO  +  y,(I,  +t  A log  Hot,  -it
+  y2 log  mt  +  y3 log  (1-t 1d) t
+ ySlog(U+t 1 )  c - y5 log  P
.4.24)  TM  t
- Y6 NKFC
+  y71  (v,  z,  EIUF)
(?)  (?)  (?)
where  a  before  dlrect  effects  are  assumed  to  dominate  indirect  effects  (for
the  cases  of  log  (11t)  and  NKF).- 43  -
V.  MPIRICAL  DETZRMINATION  OP  TIM  PRMIUM
Estimation  of this  model  with  monthly  (or  even  quarterly  data)  proved  to
be quite  a 'ormidable  task  because  the  regime  shifts  - which  tend  to average
out in the  annual  estimation  - are  important  in this  case.  Therefore,  we
elected  to undertake  this  exercise  in  a rigorous  and  detailed  fashion  in  a
separate  frture  work.  In section  III  above  however,  we discussed  the  role  of
expectations  as a  determinant  of  the  premium  using  monthly  data.
In this  paper  therefore,  only  the  extended  model  of equation  (4.24)  will
be  estimated  using  annual  data.  Tables  A.S(a)  and  A.S(b)  contain  some indirect
diagnostic  tests,  based  on the  statistical  properties  of the  annual  premium.
It is  clear  from  the  tables  that  both  the  unconditional  distributions  of the
premium  and  the  rate  of  change  of  the  premium  exhibit  departurec  from
normality,  while  no  departure  from  normality  is  found  for  the  conditional
distribution  of  the  premium  rate  of change  (the  residual  of (5.24').  The
potential  causes  of  the  departures  from  normality  are  mentioned  in  footnote
(9)  above;  but  the  important  economic  implication  of  the  above  simple  tests,
is  that  the  determination  of  the  premium,  at  least  in  the  long-run,  is  solely
accounted  for  by  economic  fundamentals.
1  The  -An  -a.L.M2ls
An eclectic  error-correction  model  based  on equation  (4.24)  of the
previous  section  is  estimated  using  annual  data from  the  period  1970-1987.
The  variables  involved  in  the  estimation  are  reported  in  table  A.5(c)  and
equation  (S.24')  contains  the  results  of OLS  estimation. To conserve  on the
degrees  of freedom;  we impose  the  condition  that the  RER fundamentals  (TOT,
taxes,  and  NKF)  enter  only in levels,  ie.  they are  restricted  to influence- 44 -
only the long-run  *pecification  of the premium.
(23')  Alogq  1.69 - 0.40 log TOTt
(1.50) (-1.58)
- 0.03  log GRANTt -0.21 log m t
(-.91)  (-1.33)
+  0.42 Alog mt
(1.63)
+  0.31 ($t 1+  t 1Alo°Et  it_ )
(2.20)
-0.45  logqel +0.24DUM(70-77)  -0.15  DUM(82-87)
(-2.35)  (2.45)  (-1.30)
2  -2
R  - 0.82,  R  - 0.62, DW - 1.60, Q(7) - 3.4
where  t-statistics  are in  parentheses  and  the  method  of estimation  is  OLS, and
Q  (7)  is the  Box-Pierce  statistic  for  residual  autocorrelation  to 7th  order.
Given  the  paucity  of the  data and  the  short  period  available  for  estimation,
the above  estimating  equation  is fairly  succossful. The explanatory  power  of
the  model  is quite  satisfactory  and  no evidence  of mis-specification  is
present. Most  of the  variables  are statistically  significant  and  the signs  of
the coefficients  are  all  consistent  with the  predictions  of the theoretical
model.
The asset  market  determinants:  the  interest  parity  differential  and
the change  in  the stock  of real  domestic  money,  have  significant  and  positive
"The  expected  devaluation  sries  used  in the construction  of the interest
parity  differential  term  of the  above  equation,  is  based  on the  annualized
predicted  values  obtained  from  the  appendix  estimating  equation  (A.1'). This
equation  is a  quarterly  version  of equation  (3.2)  discussed  in section  III
above;  see  also table  A.5(c).- 45  -
influence on the premium.  Interestingly enough the level of the stock of real
domestic money  (reflecting  the real wealth effect) was not found to be
significant.  The explanation for this is that the TOT and GRANT  (proxy for
NKF) terms provide for better indicators of the flow effect of permanent
wealth.  In an economy highly dependent on the export of a single commodity
and on foreign aid like the Zambian economy, these two xactors may be major
determinants of permanent real wealth.
The effects due to the levels of log TOT and log GRANT on the premium
are both negative.  No satisfactory measure for the relative tax variable is
available, and hence we dropped it from the regression. 2'  The effect due to
the TOT operates through at least three channels.  Two indirect channels
through the real wealth and real exchange rate flow effects.  An improvement
in TOT leads to appreciation in real wealth and hence a rise in the premium.
The effect of TOT improvements through the RER channel depends on whether the
change in TOT leads to RER depreciation or appreciation.  The third, and what
appears to be the dominant, channel is the direct effect of TOT on the supply
of foreign exchange which will have the effect of reducing the level of the
premium.
The effect of foreign aid (GRANT)  on the premium operates through two
channels.  A reduction in foreign aid (directly)  worsens the official current
account (equation (10)), as well as the unofficial current account balance
through a reduction in v (the share of official foreign exchange sale to
mThe effects due to TOT and GRANT are statistically significant at the
levels 0.15 and 0.40 respectively.  TOT and GRANT appears to be correlated,
however, and re-estimation of the above equation with GRANT dropped improves
the significance of TOT coefficient.
2'In  fact we included a term given by import tax revenue to GDP, but the
results worsened substantially.- 46  -
imports)  A reduction  in  foreign  aid  however,  will  ceterius-paribus  lead  to
real  depreciation  and  hence  a  reduction  in  the  premium.  The  results  show  that
this last  channel  is  dominated  by  the  dire.t  effect  on  the  flow  balance.  The
above  evidence  indicates  that  the  recent  sharp  decline.  in  the copper  price.
as  well as the increasing  difficulties  of external  finance,  might  have
compromised  economic  reforms  aimed  at reducing  the  premium  and  achieving
ultimate  exchange  rate  unification. The  negative  significant  effect  of the
lagged  log  of the premium,  shows  that  a high  premium  in the  previous  period  is
likely  to lead  to less  increase  in  the rate  of growth  of the  premium  in  the
following  period. Also  the  negativity  of the coefficient  of logq. 1 implies
that  in the long  run,  the  premium  depends  negatively  on TOT and  GRANT.
Finally  DUM (70-77)  and  DUM (82-87)  represent  two different  exchange  rate and
trade  regimes  where  the  premium  rose  over  the  first  period  and  steadily
declined  during  the  second,  see figure  1  of section  1 above.- 47  -
VI.  TIE EFFECTS OF TEB PREMIUM ON TRADE.
In this section the importance of the premium's link to reported and
unreported (illegal) foreign trade transactions will be assessed.  We will
estimate econometric specifications (based  on the reduced forms of section IV
above) for reported import demand and reported copper export supply,! while
the extent of misinvoicing in foreign trade will be quantified using various
statistical techniques.
1.  Reported Trade Flows.
Reported Total Private Imports:
According to equations  (4.1)  and (4.6)  of section (IV) above, we can
write reported private imports  (I,  =  V  *  .I +  (1-v) I)  in the following
generic form:
(6.1)  Ir  2(  V  +  (1-V))  (e  q,  m,  F; v,l
(+)  (  )  (  +  (  )
According  to  the  above  equation  e.  - EO  /PN  has  a  negative  impact  on  recorded
imported,  while  I,  is  positively  influenced  by  real  wealth  (m  and  F).  The
effect  due  to  the premium could not, however, be signed a priori:  a rise in q
discourage demand for aggregate imports I, but  it also lead-for a given tax
rate-to an increase in the over-invoicing ratio, ¢X.  Furthermore, clearly
both I  and q are jointly determined; hence the endogeneity of q must be
corrected  for in the estimation of the I,  specification.  I,  is also
t  Zambian exports other than copper are very  marginal.  Also the
technology and arrangements of copper exports in Zambia do nmt allow for
misinvoicing or smuggling of copper.-48  -
influenced  by discretionary  government  policy: positively  by the ratio  of
official  foreign  exchange  sale,  v, and  negatively  by government  enforcement
efforts.
Based  on equation  (6.1),  we estimated  an empirical  linear  logarithmic
dynamic  equation  for 1,  using  quarterly  data from  1970:3-1987:4. The
empirical  specification  is based  on the framework  developed  in  Moran (1989).
d Moran (1989)  specified  a demand  for  imports Ir  and a linear  relatir-;ship
linking  the long-run  volume  of imports I  with long-term  reserves  r* given
by
(6.2)  r=;a  +  Ireo,  oSa1 S1.
And another  specification  linking  actual  change  in reserve  to foreign
exchange  availability,  f,  and actual  imports:
(6.3)  Ar  =  -I
d
Subject  to these  two conditions  and  a specification  for  the  demai,d  for  imports Ir
he posed  the  problem  as choosing  I,  to minimize:
(6.4)  Cc  b1 (Iz-X;¢) 2 +  +  b 3 (I  +  b4(I-I 
In our  case  we use a linear  logarithmic  specification  for  1d,  based  on- 49 _
(6.1)  with real  wealth  (m  and  F) represented  by real  output* 
(6.5) log  Id  =  a0 +  a,  log  qt  + a2 log  e.  +  a3 log  ye  + a4 log  (l+t)  e
+asltZHFv]
where  1p,] represent  indicator  variables  for  enforcement  and  commercial
policy.
Minimizing  (6.4)  above  and  using (6.2),  (6.3),  and (6.5),  we obtain  the
following  eotimating  equation  for  reported  imports,  where  we impose  the
condition that  1;  =  f  - constant.
(6.6)  log  IT.  =  P  +  log  qt  +  P2  log  eO  +  P3 log  Yt
+  P4 log  (1+td)  t  +  P5  log  *r-  +  P 6 log  r 1 -1
The  estimation  results  of (6.6)  using  quarterly  data from  1970:3  -
1987:4  is  preuented  below.
(6.6')  log  Ir  =  -6.06  +  0.09 log  qt-0.18  log  GO
(-1.53)  (1.30)  (-2.98)
. 0.S3  log  yt +  0.22  log  Rt_
(1.21)  (5.36)
+ 0.72  log  Ir
(11.88)
-2
R  0.87,  DW  - 1.94,  Q(24)  - 27.2
t - statistics  are  in  parentheses  and  the  method  of estimation  is  OLS.m
"We  also  used  M2/Eo  for  real  wealth  but  it was found  to be insignificant.
24 Attempts  to correct  for  the  potential  endogeneity  of the  premium,  q, by
running  a 2SLS  were not  successful  in  producing  a  meaningful  empirical
specification for I,.- 50 -
Other potential determinants of I,  such as foreign trade taxes, and the
indicator variables for foreign trade policy such as own resources or
enforcement efforts were all not found to be significant.  The above results
seem to provide broad support for the predictions of the model.  The effect
due to e,  is appreciable and significant.  Of'icial real appreciation will led
to increased demand for official or recorded imports.
The effect due to the premium is significant at 10 percent significant
level and with positive though small short-run elasticity at 0.09; the derived
long-run elasticity, however, is high at 0.32.  This result shows that the
effect of the premium through the over-invoicing ratio dominates its negative
influence on aggregate demand for import.  The effect due to real income is
quantitatively high, with a 0.63 short-run elasticity and a long-run
elasticity bigger than 2; but the income effect is only marginally
significant.  The results also show the presence of considerable inertia in
the demand for reported importss  the elasticity of lagged imports is equal to
0.72 and is significant at any reasonable significant level.  Finally it is
also clear from the positive and significant effect due to official reserve
that the effect of foreign exchange constraint is an important factor in the
determination of the level of reported imports.
Copper  Exports:
Four main considerations figure in our empirical estimation of copper
export specifications in Zambia.  First, we decided to model it as export
suppiy  with foreign prices for copper taken as exogenous.  The exogeneity of
foreign prices is justified by the slowing international demand for copper and- 51  -
the  declining  share  of Zambian  copper  exports.5 In  this case,  the  main
relative  price  factor  should  reflect  the  relative  domestic  structure  of
incentives  for  copper  production. specifically,  we considered  a relative
price,  RER,&,  given  by the  ratio  of the  domestic  price  of copper  to the
building  price  index,  the  latter  being  a  proxy  for  the  domestic  price  of non-
traded  goods.  Second,  the  technology  of copper  export  supply  in Zambia
effectively  precludes  smuggling  or  mis-invoicing  of copper  exports;  thus  the
parallel  premium  is not  likely  to  have a  direct  disincentive  impact  on copper
exAort  supply. The  premium,  however,  is a good  proxy  for foreign  exchange
sho-tages,  which  during  1975/76-1989  became  the  most important  constraint,
with  a  direct  impact  on  copper  production  and  exports.
The  third  consideration  in  modelling  copper  exports  in  Zambia  is  the
issue  of regime  shifts. There  is  clear  evidence  of a  regime  shift  in  the
production  &nd  export  of copper  over  the 1960-1990  period. From 1960-1975,
transport  presented  the  principal  constraint  for  the copper  companies.
Zambian  production  fell  75,000  tons  in 1966,  due  to transport  problems  and
fuel  shortages  associated  with the  unilateral  declaration  of independence  in
Rhodesia  (1965). Another  one-shot  event  that  impacted  on copper  exports  was
the  Mufulira  mining  disaster  in  late  1969. The completion  of the TAZARA
railway  line  late  in 1975  saw  a surge  in  exports  in 1976  as accumulated  stocks
were  cleared. From 1975/76-1989,  foreign  exchange  and skills  shortages
predominated. Increased  government  control  after  nationalization  in 1970  made
nThe Zambian  share  of world  copper  production  fell  from 13  per cent  in
1961  to 6.7  per cent 1982-84  (World  Bank  Commodity  Staff  Working  Papers,  No.
15,  1987).- 52 -
the  companies  susceptible  to multiple  and sometimes  conflicting  objectiveg..6
During  the 1980s,  the  major factors  responsible  for  a 30 percent  fall in
production  were  skills  and  foreign  exchange  shortages,  transport  problems  and
poor  mineralogy  (a  declining  ore  grade  over  time).  Further,  there  was
considerable  government  diversion  of the company's  resources  into  non-mining
expenditure. These  constraints  outweighed  the effect  of a  more favorable
RER,  . .27
There  were  two  episodes  of  export  revenue  taxations  a  dual  regime  of
royalties  from  1960  and  an  export  tax  on  sales  from  mid-1966  up  to  mid-1969,
and  a  mineral  export  tax  on sales  from  1984-88. The  precise  impact  of
taxation  on the  copper  sector  requires  a  more detailed  study,  but it can  be
argued  that the  taxation  regime  of the 1960.  (aimed  at windfall  gains  during
the 1964-74  boom)  constituted  no serious  disincentive  to supply  in the  current
and  immediate  future,  but  rather  to new  mining  investment  (Garnaut  and  Ross,
1985). The  taxation  episode  in  the  1980s,  however,  proved  damaging  to the
company.
The  fourth  and  final  consideration  is  that  the  exportable  volume  of
copper  will be affected  by capacity  constraints;  increasing  production  in  the
short-run  can  be quite  costly,  hence  considerable  inertia  may  be present  in
the  production  and  export  of copper.
The  above  considerations  motivated  us to model  the  export  of copper  (in
thousand  of tonnes)  as a linear  logarithmic  function  of the following
X  The copper  companies  were 50  percent  nationalized  in 1970,  but
continued  to be managed  by the  previous  owners  until  early  1975.  The state's
share  was increased  to 60  percent  in 1979,  and  the  companies  were merged  to
form  a singlo  copper  company  in  1982.
"  ThG constraints  during  the  1980o  are  discussed  in detail  in  Aron
(1992).- 53  -
variablest  the real exchange  rate for copper as defined above, expected to
have a positive effect since real depreciation should improve the external
competitiveneas and the domestic incentive structure for copper; the rate of
change  in  the  parallel  rate premium as a proxy for foreign exchange shortages,
which should have a direct negative impact, and also possibly, though of
lesser importance, an indirect negative effect through its influence on the
domestic price of nontraded goods; the volume of copper exports in the
previous year to account for the inertia and capacity constraints; finally, a
host of dummies reflecting the various regime shifts we discussed above.
The following regressions were estimated using annual data from 1960-89
(t-statistics are in parenthesis).
(6.7)  log  EKP,,.,  =(4  76) +  (3.00)  log  RERcu,  x  DUM(1976-89=0)
*(392)  lg  XPcut_l (-2  46) A log q.  (-2  30) DUM(1966)
03.920  0.246  -0.14)
(2  74)  DUM(1972)  +  (3  426 DUM(1976)  (-3.  02)  DUM(1985-88)
R2 =  0.87,  R2 =  0.83,  Durbin H Statistics - -1.56, s.e.  =  0.07
(6.8)  log EXPCu=  (3  26  +  0 12  log RER0.b,  +  0449)  log  EXP': 1
(4.52)  (2.93)  og  (4.37)
- 0.15  A  log qc - (°i.  53  DUM(1966)
(-2.63)  - -2.03)DU(66




R2 = 0.87,  ?  0.83, Durbin H Statistics =  -2.13, o.e. =  0.07
Equation  (6.7)  estimates the joint influence of the REP;*  and the regime
shift for 1976-89.  Comparing the coefficient of the interaction term log
REFt"  x  DUM(1976-89) in (6.7)  to the coefficient of log RER;.,  in (6.8) confirms
the presence of this regime shift.  Furthermore, the relative stabilicy of
estimated coefficients of other variables in the two equations indicates that
the effect on copper exports of the regimes shifts operates through the
structure of incentives for copper i.e. the RERob  effect.  Overall both
equations lend strong support to the model, with individual effects
statistically significant and consistent with prior expectations.  The model
explains over 80 percent of the variations in the dependent variable.
Equation (6.7), which captures the regime shift, will be considered for
further analysis.
Equation (6.7) shows export supply to be strongly influenced by the
relative structure of incentive in the domestic economy as reflected by the 21
percent short-run elasticity for the REPR*  effect, which also reflects the
influence of regime shifts operating through the RER.^.  In the long-run when
full adjustment and substitution take place, the estimated effect due to RER,,
will be much higher with an elasticity close to 0.5 (equal to 0.21/0.45).
This result shows that copper export, despite its technology of production and
export arrangement, is strongly linked to the reet of the economy.  Also
according to equation (6.7),  a 100 percent rise in the premium will lead to
about 14 percent decline in the export of copper in the short-run, with the
corresponding decline in the long-run as high as 30 percent.  As we suggested
earlier, the premium is likely to be reflecting the direct effect of foreign
exchange shortages.  The estimated combined effects for the RERc,  and the- 55  -
premium  on  Zambia's  copper  exports  thus  provides  a  strong  argument  for
unification  based on its macro-level resource allocation effects  (Pinto (1989)
makes a similar argument for Ghana).
Finally, the estimated effects due to the dummies are all consistent
with the likely influences of the episodes they represent.  The dummy for 1972
captures the surge in exports due to recovery from the 1969/71 Mufulira mining
disaster.  The transport dummies, D66 and D76, capture increased constraints
after U.D.I., and the export surge with the opening of TAZARA.  Lastly, the
results show that the mineral export tax on sales (DUM(1985-88) had a serious
disincentive effect on copper exports.
The export supply is characterized by considerable inertia, with the
lagged export supply having an elasticity of 0.45.  This result is fairly
consistent with the prevailing technology in the sector.
2.  The misinvoicing of foreign trade
The misinvoicing of foreign trade arises in response to excess demand
created by the use of exchange controls and trade restrictions. An overvalued
exchange rate and foreign exchange controls create excess demand in the market
for foreign exchange, leading to the formation of a black market with a
premium on the official rate of exchange.  Profit opportunities created by the
existence of dual rates induce additional supply and demand in the market.
Importers, using legal trade channels, may over-invoice their imports to
obtain extra currency and sell the balance on the black market. Similarly,
exporters have an incentive to under-invoice exports.3 The illegal proceeds
2Where there are restrictions on the private holdings of foreign assets,
flight from domestic currency via over-invoiced imports or under-invoiced
exports could be illegally directed abroad.- 56  -
of smuggling activities channelled through the black market provide a further
source of supply.
Additional foreign exchange requirements arising from under-invoiced
imports or over-invoiced exports would be also met by the unofficial market
for foreign exchange. This type of misinvoicing of trade is due to evasion of
trade and price controls. In Cooper (1974)  the blanket term "smuggling" is
used to encompass four types of evasion of duties and taxes:  the
under-invoicing of exports and imports, under-assessment of duties,  the
mis-classification of imports, and failure to record trade, in which case it
is either of the "ships in the night" variety using illegal ports of entry, or
passes covertly through legal channels. Over-invoiced exports may also arise
where export subsidies exceed the discount obtainable on the unofficial
market.9  Finally, where price controls imposed on exports or importables
create  a  premium  with  respect  to  border  prices  there  is  an  ince  tive  to  evade
these  controls  by  smuggling  through  illegal  channels.
The successful pursuit of "smuggling" and capital flight is constrained
by the vigilance of customs officials and the degree of complicity in illicit
trade.  Low penalties, laxity in enforcing penalties and diffieulties in
policing large borders will facilitate illegal trade.
The combinations of incentives arising in consequence of various
controls serve to drive misinvoicing in different directions."  A mix of
smuggling types and modes of capital flight  may be present at any one time.
'Foreign exchange retention schemes aimed at promoting non-traditional
exports constitute a de facto subsidization.
t There  are  a  number  of  legitimate  reasons  for  inconsistent  trade  data
apart from illegal trade activities, and these are discussed in Section 2.1.- 57  -
Penalties for different kinds of illicit trade and the degree of enforcement
may differ. In the aggregate therefore, whilst an order of magnitude for
unrecorded trade may be achievable from discrepancies in reported exports and
imports when matched against partner-country trade data, attribution to a
particular form of illegal activity is not straightforward, and may be
impossible. Cancellation effects may well result in an understatement of the
magnitude of unrecorded trade.
For an individual importer  who faces  dual incentives to under-invoice
for evasion of tariffs or quotas and to over-invoice in the face of a
substantial black market premium, the direction of misinvoicing will be
determined by the difference between the black market premium and the rent due
to an import license or the rate of tariff, further discounting for the risk
entailed in engaging in illegal dealings.
By its nature, illicit trade is difficult to detect and to quantify.
However, where strong incentives have been created for these activities,
detection and an estimate of magnitude is important.  Reported statistics will
not reflect the actual extent of trade nor the nature of capital flows.
Under-invoicing of imports and exports and smuggling results in the recorded
volume of trade being smaller than the "truew volume, while  over-invoicing of
imports and exports, will exaggerate the volume of trade.  Where illicit
activities are extensive, reported trade statistics will be inaccurate and
policy prescriptions relying on them may be compromised.
In the last two decades a growing literature has attempted to integrate
illegal trade phenomena into the pure theory of internatlonal trade.
Statistical methods originating from the Morgenstern (1950) study continue to
be explored to assess the accuracy of international trade statistlcs and to- 58  -
detect and quantify illicit trade activities.  In Yeats (1990), two decades of
Sub-Saharan export data were examined for trade discrepancies with developed
countries and other African countries. Major disparities were found, and these
were substantially larger for intra-African trade. The  study concludes that
these data are unreliable as regards the level, composition, direction and
trends of African trade. In what follows, methods from the empirical
literature are briefly outlined and are applied to Zambian import statistics.
2.1  Statistical methods for the detection of unrecorded trade.
Direct methods of detection such as apprehending smugglers, comparing
individual invoices with world prices and interviewing traders, are clearly
limited in scope.  Indirect methods rely on comparisons of quantity, price and
value data, both between partner countries and within the country.  Table 6
(a) summarizes expected price, quantity and value discrepancies for different
kinds of illicit trade (adapted from Bhagwati (1981)).  This classification
encompasses most reported statistical methods for the detection and
quantification of faked invoicing and smuggling, and indicates the
poebibilities for distingu.ishing  amongst different kinds of illicit trade.
The indirect methods are applicable at various levels of disaggregation.
Available data may only permit aggregate comparisons of quantity, value and
price data.  Aggregate comparisons provide a lower bound for illicit activity,
but where individual classes of commodities can be examined, more information
will be provided about incentives for illegal trade and the nature of the
activity.
Discrepancies in value data between countries may be due either to the
misrepresentation of prices or of quantities of Imports. Partner-country-data- 59  -
comparisons  of quantity  or value  were first  explored  by Morgenstern  (1950).
Discrepancies  between  the imports  recorded  by a country  and  exports  to that
country  recorded  by itu  trading  partners  (or  between  recorded  exports  and
partner-country  imports)  may  be due  to a number  of factor.  besides  false
invoicing,  some  of which  can  be corrected  for. 3 "  But  once  allowances  have
been  made for  these  factors,  a positive  or negative  percentage  difference
indicates  mis-invoicing.  In the  case  of imports,  a positive  percentage
difference  implies  net  over-invoicing  (PfQf  - PcQc  < 0 in column  5  of Table  6
(a)),  while  a negative  figure  indicates  net  under-invoicing.  The  reverse
holds  true in  the  case  of own-country  exports. 32
2.2  An ao2roximate  guantifigation  of misinvoicing  in Zambia.
The empirical  analysis  is confined  to unrecorded  imports. Zambia  has  a
"'(a)  International  transport  and insurance  coets  may be captured  by
converting  imports  from  a c.i.f.  to an f.o.b.  basis. Bhagwati  et al (1974)
assume  this  discrepancy  to be 10  per  cent  on average.  Yeats (1990)  has
calculated  transport  correction  factors  for  trade  with  the  U.S.A.. (b)  Lags in
recording  imports  which  have  already  been  recorded  as  exported  by  the  partner
country  leads  to  an  understatement  of  own  country  imports.  Averaging
successive  years,before  comparing  data  may smooth  this  discrepancy  (Raya  and
Morgan,  1974).  (c)  Under-invoicing  by partner  countri$e  will  understate  their
exports  and  in the  comparison  show  up as  overinvoicing  of own  country  imports.
The incentives  for  trading  partners  to fake  invoicing  can  be assessed  and  the
comparison  be conducted  across  several  countries.  (d)  Other  error  sources  are
less  easily  adjusted  for:  errors  of commodity  classification,  different
recording  definitions  and simple  errors  in  counting  and  recording.  Multiple
exchange  rates  may  also  cause  trade  discrepancies  where  rates  alter  during  the
period  reported,  or where  the  wrong  rate  is used for  conversion.
NWhere  the  data  is  available,  partner-country-data  comparisons  of traded
volumes  may  establish  discrepancies,  as  in  Richter  (1974)  for  Indonesian
rubber  exports.  Even  without  comprehensive  quantity  data,  it  is  posesible  to
distinguish  between  value  discrepancies  arising  from  quantity  an opposed  to
unit  price  differences,  because  they  generate  different  inequality  signs  for
the  disparity  between  the  declared  landed  import  price  and  the  domestic  price
of  the import  (column  1  of Table  6 (a))._  60  -
high  import-dependence:  imports  as a  percentage  of  CDP averaged  over  30  per
cent  from 1964  to the present  day.  The  principal  imports  are  capital  and
intermediate  goods  which  display  product  differentiation.
Under-invoicing  of exports  in Zambia  is  unlikely  to be a significant
component  of capital  flight,  given  the  predominance  of  metals  in the
composition  of exports  trading  at known  world  prices.  This has  been confirmed
by Yeats (1990)  where  export  discrepancies  for  Zambia  in 1982-83  with
industrial  countries  were in  the  range  of transport  correction  factors.0
Export  smuggling  in  the  emerald  industry,  on the  other  hand,  is reputedly
rifo.  The  report  of the 1979  Commission  of Enquiry  into  the emerald  industry
claims  35-40  per cent  of the  world  market  share  for  Zambia  and sUggests  that
80 per  cent  of the emeralds  produced  are  mined  and  exported  illegally. The
report  recognized  the  role  of a  subatantial  black  market  premium  in
stimulating  emerald  smuggling.
In Table  6 (b),  the  recorded  exports  of Zambia's  trading  partners  are
compared  with Zambian  recorded  imports  from 1968  to 1985.  The  ratios
R - 100.(Mz-Xf)/Xf,  where  Mz are  Zambian-recorded  f.o.b.  imports  and  Xf,
partner  country-recorded  f.o.b.  exports,  are shown  for  the  U.K. and  the  U.S.A.
(which  comprise  on average  22 per  cent  and  10 per cent  of Zambian  imports,
respectively),  for  the six  main  trading  partners,  excluding  South  Africa  and
Saudi  Arabia,  and for  the  O.E.C.D.  as a  whole (comprising  60  per cent  of
"Export  trade  with  Malawi  in 1982-83  (largely  non-copper),  however,
showed  clear  evidence  of under-invoicing  (poosibly  exacerbated  by import  over-
invoicing  on the  part  of Malawians).
3'South  African  exports  to ZambLa  are  contained  within  an aggregate  for
trade  with Africa  and  comparison  was unfortunately  not  possible:  in the last
decade  South  Africa  has  provided  about  one fifth  of Zambia's  imports.  Saudi
Arabian  trade  is  predominantly  in  oil,  which  analogous  to copper  is unlikely
to be misinvoiced;  but  other  studies  have  found  significant  discrepancies  due- 61 -
imports). Outside of the above-mentioned countries, trade is erratic and
limited, and the data patchy; so further comparisons were unlikely to be
meaningful.
Increasing product differentiation probably facilitates misinvoicing as
departures from standard prices make confirmation of prices more difficult.
Disaggregating imports to focus upon manufactured imports (SITC 5-8) in the
comparison should amplify disparities (Bhagwati et al, 1974). However, the
majority of Zambian imports already falls into SITC categories 5-8: these
account for 77 per cent of imports in 1970 and 1975, and 70 per cent in the
early  19 80 s.  M
Trends shown for the U.K. and the U.S.A., the largest non-oil trading
partners apart from South Africa, are similar to those for the six main
partners and the O.E.C.D. (R-values  are larger for the individual countries,
in part because cancellation effects are diminished). All four series suggest
that capital flight through overinvoicing was rife during the copper boom,
1966-1974. After the 1971 copper price shock exchange controls and import
levels became more restrictive. The premium doubled in 1972 and over-invoicing
was sustained; but the terms of trade recovery from .473 saw a diminution of
the premium and misinvoicing. A precipitous fall in the copper price in 1974
induced a further tightening of trade policy and exchange controls. The
premium more than doubled from 1975-77, further influenced by an increasingly
overvalued exchange rate and the persistence of poor terms of trade. In
tandem, misinvoicing grew (this is most apparent in the U.S.A. figures).
to confusion over the ownership of refineries and petroleum (Bhagwati, 1974).
35Categories  SITC 1-4 comprise food, beverages and tobacco, crude
materials, animal fats and mineral fuels. The exclusion of Saudi Arabia then
serves to remove the mineral fuels category.- 62 -
From a peak  of 190  per cent  in 1977,  the  premium  fell  steadily  during
the  second  and third  exchange  rate  policy  episodes  until  the auction.  Between
1978  and  1979  alone,  the fall  amounted  to almost  40 percentage  points,  induced
primarily  by favorable  copper  prices.  Misinvoicing  was negligible  until  1981
when  a sharp  deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  saw  a revival  of over-
invoicing. In the  two  years  preceding  the  auction  of October,  1985,  the
premium  averaged  30 percent,  a low  level  compatible  with the  maintenance  of
oŽxchange  controls. Under-invoicing  appears  to have  taken  place  in 1984,  while
misinvoicing  falls  in 1985  with the  onset  of the  auction.
Given  the paucity  of data in  the 1980s,  the  complementary  nature  of
import  unit  value  comparisons  proves  useful.  A rough  aggregate  measure  of the
misinvoicing  trend  for  imports  is  achieved  by the comparison  of import  unit
values  between  countries  with a similar  composition  of imports. The
difference  in their  respective  tendencies  to over invoice  may  be captured  by
the  difference  in reported  CIF import  unit  values,  converted  to a common
currency  (Bevan  et al,  1990).
In  Table  6 (c),  the  Kenyan  import  unit  value  for  manufacturing  converted
to Kwacha  is  compared  with the  constructed  value  for  Zambia.  Disaggregated
import  unit value  indices  for  manufacturing  were chosen  to ensure  that  a
similar  composition  of imports  was  being  compared,  but  also  because  product
differentiation  in  manufactured  goods  make  them the  most liable  1'
misinvoicing. The trends  for  misinvoicing  compare  well  with the  partner-
country-data  trade  comparisons. What is clearly  apparent  in the  series  is a
tendency  to over-invoicing  when copper  prices  fall (after  1974  and 1981)  and
3 6The  Kenyan  black  market  premium  was  not  pronounced  over  this period
averaging  10 per cent  for 1975-80  and  20 per  cent for  1981-84t  in 1985  and
1986  it virtually  disappeared.- 63 -
under-invoicing whsere  terms of trade improve (1973/4 and 1979/80).  An
interesting feature is the high level of over-invoicing seen during the early
1980s, which fell back prior to the foreign exchange auction, when under-
invoicing predominated 37
This correspondence between the R-values and changes in the premium and
trade regime may be shown more formally by regressing the trade ratios on a
constructed series for the smuggling incentive. Following McDonald  (1985), the
incentive is defined as I=(q/(l-ti))-1, where q is the premium expressed as a
ratio, and ti is the import tax rate. McDonald (1985)  examined exports only,
where tx was proxied by the average tax rate for the export aggregate.  For
import restrictions in Zambia, quotas are more important than tariffs. A
measure of implicit trade policy is given by the differential between the CIF
value of imports (pre-trade policy prices) and the retail price of domestic
import substitutes (post-trade  policy). This is shown in Figure 6 (a) and ia
used here as a proxy for ti, capturing the endogenous trade liberalization of
the boom period and subsequent tightening of restrictions. The initial figure
is set at 15 per cent, the average tariff value for non-luxury goods in 1969.
Statistical characteristics are given in Table 6 (d) for I and the
smoothed series of R-values (expressed  as a ratio of reported imports to
partner exports). The mean of I  is fairly large (1.27)  with wide variation
about the mean. A positive correlation between the trade discrepancies and the
smuggling incentive is suggested in Figure 6 (b) 38, and supported by the
simple correlation coefficient of 0.75 (1969-80) (Table 6 (d)).
37  The fiscal implications of this altered trend in misinvoicing on
exchange rate unification are examined in Section VII, 2.
fThis is shown only for the U.S.A. and the O.E.C.D.: other series showed
a similar correspondence.- 64  -
The trade ratios were regressed on I and the lagged dependent variable
and dummy variables used to capture regime shifts and exogenous shocks:
TR = a + bI  +  cTR  + D.
t  t  t-1
The results are shown in Table 6 (a) and compared with McDonald's
results for Zairean exports.  The constant should display the level of the
trade ratio in the absence of smuggling if trade is constant; otherwise the
steady-state level (a/(l-c)) should approximate 1 if transport costs have been
accounted for.  All three import regressions incorporating the lagged
dependent variable display the latter feature.  In the McDonald etudy, f,r the
nine countries examined, fifteen export regressions were run and in only four
of these did I prove significant.  For Zambian O.E.C.D. imports too, the
coefficient on the smuggling incentive for the first two regressions is
positive but not significantly different from zero.  Previous misinvoicing
exerts a significant influence on current misinvoicing.  The 1974 and 1976
dummies have the expected signs: the 1973/74 terms of trade recovery saw the
premium fall and with it misinvoicing; after 1975, poor terms of trade
combined with tightened controls produced the opposite effect.  Inclusion of
the lagged incentive in the third regression produces a combined positive
coefficient for I with improved significance and the dummy has the expected
sign.
Some limited support is provided by these results for the trade ratio
and smuggling incentive link.  However, the results are sensitive to the
period examined and the dummies included, while poor data and institutional
and regiae changes exacerbate the problems of equation instability.- 65  -
VII.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  PREMIUM  ON  DOMESTIC  INFLATION  AND  FISCAL  BALANCE.
In this section we will assess the importance of the premium's link to
domestic inflation and investigate the impact of exchange rate unification on
the fiscal balance.  We will estimate a simple econometric model of inflation
in which the premium affects domestic inflation directly through the traded
goods prices and indirectly through disequilibrium in the money market.  We
estimate a seigniorage Laffer Curve for the auction period and establish
empirically the location on this curve of sub-periods of the crawling peg and
auction episodes. The government is shown to be a net buyer of foreign
exchange and fiscal revenue implications are drawn.
1.  Domestic Inflation
To study the relevance of the parallel rate (or  premium) to domestic
inflation we consider the following simple model.  Let the domestic price of
tradeables, PT,  be given by
(7.1)  PTEEb-P  3
where P* stands for foreign price and OSasl.  Let the pri'e cf nontraded
goods, P.N  be specified as a mark-up over PT.
(7.2)  PNd=P+(l+1)
and the rate of change in the mark-up function p  is made to depend on excesa
39  A more general specification than (7.1) can be considered where P+Eo
could be adjusted for taxes and P*Eb  for the unit cost of smuggling  (e.g.
Chhibber and Shafik (1990).  These extensions will not influence the final
inflation 'quation however, if we assume zero rates of changes in smuggling
cost and tax  rate.- 66 -
demand for nontradeables.
(7.3)  ft-flc.-Y.)
Excess demand for nontradables (CN - YN)  can in turn be linked to
disequilibriums in the balance of payment and the monetary sector.  A balance
of payment surplus (deficit)  must be accompanied by an excess demand  (supply)
for nontraded goodi of equal magnitude, measured in domestic prices.  Given
the importance of copper prices to both private sector incomes and public
sector revenues, and the limited effectiveness of the authorities in Zambia at
shielding the domestic economy from balance of payment surpluses brought about
by the price of copper; we specify the excess demand for nontradables to
depend on the real price of copper, P.  i.e.
(7.4)  CN - YM =  g  (Pw)
Equations (7.3) and (7.4) permit a direct link between inflation and the price
of copper --  reflecting the usual Dutch disease phenomenon.
The income-expenditure model focuses on the goods markots and therefore
it neglects the link between the aggregate market for goods and the money
market.  In an economy such as the one in Zambia where a sizable and tolerated
dual market coexist with a highly regulated official sector, monetary
disequilibrium (W>P.m')  can lead to nontraded goods price increases,
depreciation in the black market exchange rate, and worsening in both the
regulated official as well as the unreported private current accounts.  To the
extent that the black market is allowed to float freely, the impact of
monetary disequilibrium is likely to be more reflected in terms of
nontradables price inflation and depreciating black market rate (or rising- 67  -
premium).  Based on the above discussion, we add to the mark-up function the
change in the rate of depreciation of the black exchange market rate,  AA'b  b
to reflect monetary disequilibrium:
(7.5)  M5-Pmd  =A  b)
Now using (7.4) and (7.5)  on  f  (CN-YN,MM-Pmd)  )  we  write  the
following  expression  for the rate of change in the mark-up functic..:
(7.6)  a1  =  at  log  PCUp  +  a2  ^£b
Now we define the aggregate price equation, P, as a  weighted  geometric  mean  of
PT  and  PN.
(7.7)  P=Pr  PL_A  and  O<A<1.
Equations (7.1) - (7.7)  lead  to  the  following  expression  for  domestic  price
inflation.
(7.8)  SC=  [;A+P  ('-])  Le¢+*40,1+  (1-a)  ['%+P  '-A%)  It+  (1-A)  [sllogCPVup+'2ARb,]
Direct entimation of (7.8)  did not produce satisfactory results. Estimation of
(7.8) in terms of acceleration of inflation is  successful, however. Therefore,
the following empirical reduced form is estimated using annual data from 1970
to  1986.- 68 -
(7.  9)  Al  =80I  [Pt  2 4 3 1ogPcupr+8 4 A2b.O 5 Azt
An interesting hypothesis to test is HO:  61=62.  This hypothesis implies
that official exchange rate depreciation does not enter as a factor leading to
accelerated domestic inflation.  Rather, the cost push factors causing
domestic price inflation are foreign inflation and black market depreciation.
Before discussing the results of estimating the above equation we briefly
review the evolution of domestic prices in Zambia.
The story of inflation and the black market rate in Zambia is succinctly
told in graphs 7 (a)  and 7 (b).  The first graph shows the quarterly evolution
of aggregate inflation in the consumer price index (CPI),  the wholesale price
index (WPI), in addition to the rate of depreciation in the black market rate.
While the black rate has experienced considerable volatility during the
period, CPI inflation was very stable and WPI is only slightly more variable.
The observed low CPI and WPI price inflation is due to the fact that
most of their components are affected by price controln.  Price controls have
been applied to three major categories of prices from Independence:  producer
prices of agricultural goods, prices of "essential commodities" and the prices
of some products of parastatal companies.  Price controls were applied until
December, 1982, when there was a decontrol of retail and wholesale prices,
save for maize meal, wheat flour and bread and candles.  Apparently the
parastatal prices continued to be restrained after decontrol.  Riots ensued in
December, 1986 after maize prices (the only remaining controlled price) were
decontrolled (see  Table 3 (c)).  After the auction was abandoned in May, 1987,
price controls were again applied.  It appears that price controls were not- 69 -
rigorously enforced in the 1970a; 4  however, control of parastatals' prices
has obviously been easier to enforce th&n for the private sector.
The PIC lists of "essential" commodities on which price controls were
imposed in 1973 and 1987, contain most of the principal components of the CPI.
The WPI series on the other hand is comprised of electricity (state owned and
price controlled), agriculture (where producer prices are held below border
prices), mining (where  metal domirtates  and the products are not consumed
domestically), and manufacturing (wi;ich  includes parastatal manufacturing).
Given the nature of the abovb data, it is perhaps not surprising that
neither CPI nor WPI Inflation lend any satisfactory validation to the above
model.  A price series based on disaggregating the WPI into the manufacturing
components and then excluding the parastatal-dominated manufacturing
categories (food,  beverages, and tobacco)4"  would seem to be the least
affected by controls. This construct (WMI)  should be the appropriate series to
use for the estimation.
Using the created WMI series, two versions of equation (7.9)  were
estimated.  The results are shown in equetion (7.9') and (7.9")  below, t-
statistics are in parenthesis.
(7.9')  Anc-'I  1.40  - 0.  50  0Pe+o]  +  0.60  4,+  0.30  logPcup,+  0.12  AA'b,
(4.87) (2.29)  (3.20)  (4.67)  (1.12)
'°According  to the Zambian Prices and Income Commission (PIC),  there were
few prosecutions and in response to shortages a rampant black market was in
evidence by the late 70s.
"1Within  the parastatal sector, output is concentrated predominantly in
food, beverages and tobacco; further, the parastatal share of manufacturing
GDP in this catigory was over 70 per cent between 1970 and 1980.- 70  -
R2 - 0.75, DW - 2.38
(7.9")  ASC*10  1.45 +  0.57  [P+tO]  +  0.31  log PCUPej  0,  1.  A. b
(5.70) (3.32)  (5.68)  (1.09)
2=  0.77, DW - 2.38
Equation (7.9') is the unrestricted version of (7.9), while (7.9")
imposes the restriction 61=62.  This restriction could not be rejected at any
reasonable significance level (t=-0.56).  The acceptability of this
restriction -y the data is also reflected in the similarities of  the two
empirical results in (7.9') and (7.9").
With the above restriction taken as a maintained hypothesis, the result
in (7.9") indicates that foreign inflation and depreciation of the parallel
rate are important cost push factors causing acceleration in the rate of
domestic inflation in Zambia.  Furthermore, previous period exchange rate
devaluations were not shown to influence current period change in domestic
inflation.  The income effect channeled through the balance of payment is also
found to be lead to an increase in domestic inflation.  The other channel of
excess demand for nontraded goods --  working through the money market and
reflected by the change in the rate of depreciation of the parallel rate --
has however, amaller and only slightly significant effect on inflation.
2. The Fiscal Balance.
Pinto (oo.cit.)  argues for the primacy of fiscal policy and the need to
design the pace of exchange rate policy i  D  be consistent with fiscal reform.
The rationale is that if the government is a net buyer of foreign exchange
from the private sector, there is a trade-off between the premium as a tax on- 71  -
exports and the inflation tax, when the inflation elasticity of the demand for
domestic currency is less than 1. The inflation elasticity rises with the rate
of inflation (as the incentive for flight from domestic money increases)
giving rise to a seigniorage Laffer Curve (see Figure 7(c)). For inflation
rates above the seigniorage-maximizing level of inflation the unit inflation
tax will fall and no trade-off is present. Thus, if the fiscal deficit remains
high while credibility is low, aggressive exchange rate policy could lead both
to uiisustainable  post-unification inflation and a higher premium as flight
from domestic money intensifies, resulting in a decline in seigniorage
revenue.  Both sides of the Pinto proposition were tested using monthly data
for the two unification episodes in Zambia, the crawling peg and the foreign
exchange auction.
The fiscal revenue implications of a devaluation-driven unification,
where the government is a net buyer of foreign exchange, are summarized in
Table 7 (a).  The Bank of Zambia's foreign exchange budget was used to show
that the government was a small net buyer of foreign exchange during the
auction (Table 7(b)).  The effect of auction-related grants and loans is to
diminish this position.  In Table 7(c), it is established that the signs for
inflation tax in both phases of the auction correspond with those predicted in
column (3] of Table 7(a).
Following Pinto (1985),  the seigniorage maximizing rate of inflation
(Pi*) for the entire period of the auction was estimated with monthly data by
fitting a Laffer Curve of the type:
(7.10)  V - a  Pi + b Pi 2 ,
(  )  (  )
where  V, the inflation  tax, is  defined  as the  real stock  of money  times  the- 72 -
growth rate of nominal money (expected signœ of the coefficients are
indicated). The first order condition then yields the seigniorage maximizing
level of inflation (  Pi* =  a/2b ).  The results of the estimation are contained
in equation  (7.10') below:
(7.10')  V =  767.38 Pi -99.81 pi2  +3806.21 OCT85
(2.88)  (2.33)  (2.37)
+8007.17 SEP86  -1168.42 MAR87 -2211.04 JAN87 +5685.89 APR87
(3.30)  (0.98)  (1.72)  (2.67)
DW =  2.35  R2 =  0.58  N=19,
where t-statistics are in parentheses and the method of estimation is OLS.  The
signs of the significant coefficients for inflation and its square are as
expected. Regime shifts were captured using dummy variables for particular
months (see Table 3(c)).  Solving for the fi:st order condition gives the
result that Pi* is 3.84.
In Table 7(b), monthly averages of inflation, seigniorage, the premium,
official depreciation and the budget deficit are shown for sub-periods of the
unification episodes. The crawling peg sub-episodes and stable phase of the
auction lie on the good side of the Laffer Curve. There is a trade-off between
the premium and rate of official depreciation in the first three sub-periods,
with sustainable deficits and reasonable credibility of reform. In the
unstable phase the trade-off disappears: both the premium and inflation rise
strongly, while the budget deficit is high and credibility low.  Monthly
inflation and depreciation rates are shown in Figure 7(d).
The signs for Central Bank profits, predicted in column (1] of Table
7(a), were confirmed for both phases of the auction (Table 7(b)).  Average- 73  -
monthly  profits  due  to  foreign  exchange  transactions  alone  in  the  stable
phaseG2 fell  and  were  low  at  k16  million;  they  increased  to  K62  million  on
average  per  month  in  the  unstable  phase,  when  the  premium  was  high  and
official  depreciation  accelerated.'3
Finally,  the  movement  of  illegal  activity  onto  markets  where  it  can  be
taxed  is  predicted  to  produce  a  favorable  fiscal  effect  for  episodes  lying  on
the  good  side  of  the  Seigniorage  Laffer  Curve  (Table  7(a),  column  (21).
Assessing  this  potential  effect  for  import  revenue  in  Zambia's  auction"  is
complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  minimum  rate  of  customs  duty  was  raised  and
its  coverage  extended  in  February,  1986;  further,  misinvoicing  data  suggests  a
move  from  over-  to  under-invoicing  in  the  auction,  decreasing  recorded
revenue.  Subject  to  these  caveats,  average  quarterly  receipts  for  taxes  on
imports'  for  the  auction  as  a  whole  increased  to  K78.5  million,  from  K59.2
million  in  the  preceding  seven  quarters.  Quarterly  averages,  however,  do
suggest  a  10  percent  decrease  in  revenue  from  the  stable  to  the  unstable
phase;  the  decline  may  be  underestimated  if  overinvoicing  increased  in  the
unstable  phase.
In  conclusion,  our  results  for  Zambia  lend  support  to  both  halves  of  the
Pinto  Proposition.
42  Profits  on foreign  exchange  tansctions  Slone  due to the pretence  of dual rates were estimated  as follows: P-(Xp-Mp).(Eb-
EO),  where Eb is tho black rate and EO,  the official  rte  of exchange. Data wer  available from 1986  only; the final quater of 1985  is thus
not included  in the total for the  table  phase.
43 However,  a pipeline  in foreign  exchange  disbursementa  began from August 1986,  with a ten week lag. Given the rate of
depreciation  of the currency  in the unsable phase, the Centrl Bank  was forced  to make curmnt purchases  of foreign exchange  at a premium
on the originally  agreed  sale price. Bates  et &l  (1991)  estimte this premium  to be about 25 percent and suggest  pipeline  losse with an
upper bound  of KI billion.
"  Section  VI found  little evidence  for large-scale  smuggling  activities  in exports.
4  The sum  of sales  tax and customs  duties, deflated  by the quarterly  WPI, 1985  prices.- 74 -
VIII.  TER PROBLEMS OF UNIFICATIONt SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE LESSONS
FROM ZAMBIA.
rn  a country like Zambia where the olack market for foreign exchange is
wide-spread and tends to have strong macroeconomic links, traditional
objectives of economic reforms, such as stabilizing the macroeconomy and
achieving real depreciation, are equivalent to the objectives of stabilizing
the free market rate and reducing the premium, and perhaps ultimately
achieving exchange rate unification or at least successfully delinking the
black market from the major sectors of the economy.  In this section we
address three main issueq related to the question of unification, drawing from
the analysis of previous sections.  First, we consider the evidence for
problems that the presence of a large parallel market might have caused in
macroeconomic management and economic reform in Zambia.  Secondly, we review
the recent experience and indicate what went wrong with previous unification
attempts, again drawing from the evidence of our analysis.  Thirdly, we
attempt to identify some lessons that can be gleaned from the above
discussion.
First, the econometric analysis of this paper (see section VII) shows
that a large premium can have deleterious effects on copper exports, directly
as an indicator of foreign exchange shortages and indirectly through its
negati.ve  influence on the domestic structure of incentives for the officially
sanctioned copper economy.  A high premium also was found to encourage over-
importing (and probably over-invoicing) of officially traded imports.  The
black market rate was also found to have a significant effect on domestic
inflation through at least two channels.  Depreciation of the black market
rate and foreign inflation directly increase domestic inflation through the- 75 -
cost-push channel.  The other effect is indirect and operates through the
money market disequilibrium.
Our analysis based on monthly data clearly reveals that the short run
evolution of the premium reflects the impact of anticipated political events
and changes in economic policy.  The evolution of the premium also fits well
with the story of expected devaluation based on the model of this paper. Thus
the premium does not only affect inflation and the real exchange rate but it
also serves as a signal for lack of credibility of economic reform and
unsustainability of macroeconomic policy.  As such, some form of exchange rate
unification must have been eithar an explicit or an implied objective of
recent economic reform in Zambia.  The concept of unification we have in mind
doe. not call for a zero level of the premium, however.  At least for the case
of capital controls, liberalization may not be possible nor desirable for some
time to come in Zambia.  It is important, however, to liberalize major trade
and financia. markets in a way that will compress the parallel market and
prevent the premium from serving as a major signal to the economy.
Secondly, this quest for unification perhaps explains the primacy
accorded to exchange rate policy in the conduct of macroeconomic policy over
the last decade.  Considerable official depreciation was achieved during the
crawling peg period (July 1983 to October 1985) with the rate of annual
nominal devaluation averaging 27 percent compared to less than 8 percent
during the immediate two years preceding the crawl.  Despite considerable
official depreciation the premium remained high and in the final year of the
crawl it rose considerably to match the pre-crawl historical average.  The
premium declined quickly and sharply when the auction system was introduced,
as part of the IMF-supported economic reform in the fourth quarter of 1985.- 76 -
The decline in the premium from 68 percent in 1985 to 31 percent in 1986 came
to a halt in the second year, and ir 1988 the year following the suspension of
the auction, it soared to 418 percent.
According to the analysis of this paper, the major factor behind the
failure of unification and economic reform in general is the fundamental
endogeniety of the parallel premium with respect to macroeconomic and trade
policy as well as exogenous shocks in terms of trade and foreign aid.  As we
saw in section IV the expansive fiscal and monetary policy that has been
pursued and sharply declining terms of trade could not be consistent wit; the
unification objective.  The econometric analysis of this paper shows that
improvement in the terms of trade or an increase in foreign aid will lead to a
decline in the premium.  It appears that the direct influence of these two
factors in the stock of foreign money dominates their indirect effects
through real wealth and real appreciation, which work to increase tha premium.
With regard to the role of economic policy, our results show that the direct
effect and the indirect effect (operating  through expoctations of future
devaluation) of expansive fiscal and monetary policy will cause the premium to
rise.
In terms of the relative importance of the above two sets of influences
on the premium that may have caused the failure of exchange rate unification
and other objectives of economic reform, it appears that adverse external
terms of trade shocks dominate.  During the first two years of the peg (1983-
1984) the fiscal deficit as a ratio to GDP averaged about 7.5 percent,
compared to more than 18 percent in 1982.  The rate of growth in the supply of
(narrow)  money declined from 22 percent in 1982 to 15 and 9 percent for the
following two years.  The terms of trade on the other hand have experienced- 77 -
dramatic declines throughout the 80's decade.  Compared to 1980 the terms of
trade declined by 43 percent in 1981 and by 80 percent for the first two years
of the crawling peg regime.  Therefore, the apparently considerable effort at
macroeconomic restraint (at least compared with the history of macroeconomic
policy in the country) while substantial nominal devaluation was being
effected  by  the  crawl policy, was clearly undermined by the sharp negative
terms of trade shock.
For the last year of the peg regime and the two years of the auction
(1985-1987) the terms of trade continued to be low and stable at around 30
percent  .f  the 1980 index.  The driving force behind the persistence of the
premium during this period, however, was outright laxity in fiscal and
monetary policy.  The fiscat deficit ratio increased by 100 percent to average
15 percent for the period, and the rate of Ml growth increased from 12 percent
for the previous period to 41 percent in 1985, and to more than 60 percent for
1986-87.  The analysis of the paper shows the premium to be responsive to
economic  and  political  development  and  that  the  premium  is  influenced  by
agents'  expectations  of  future  devaluation,  influenced  in  turn  by  past  fiscal
and monetary policy.  This implies  that the perceived incredibility or
unsustainability of the program, especially during 1985 and the following two
years of the auction, had a hand in the failures of the crawling peg and the
auction regimes, and the ultimate collapse of the economic reform program in
1987.
We conclude with a  subscription to Pinto (1987) in that 'Zambia's
experience indicates that exchange rate reform without fiscal reform may be
futile'.  While we uphold the view that emphasize the role of fiscal policy we
hasten to point out that the unsustainability of the fiscal retrenchment that- 78  -
was pursued  for  the first  two  years  of the crawling  peg seemed  to be
influenced  more by political  economy  considerations  than by the  Pinto  effect.
Zambia  is  one  of tho  most urbanized  countries  in  Africa  with  the share  of the
urban  population  estimated at 50  percent. Also the  Zambian  urban  middle
class  is known  to have  wielded  considerable  influence  over the  years.  This
explains  the  pervasive  ensemble  of price  control  and  subsidy  schemes  that
survived the  reform  attempts  of the last  decade. On the  other  hand,
government  revenue  as a ratio  to GDP  has  never  been less  than  20 percent
deapite  the  sharp  declines  in the  terms  of trade,  this  rate being  one  of the
highest  in  Africa. Therefore  the  case  of Zambia  suggests  that  more emphasis
should  be given  to  the  political  economy  and  the  distributional  consequences,
especially  the  rural-urban  nexus,  at the  early  stages  of the economic  reform
program.
Finally,  it is evxdent  that  the  economy  of Zambia  being  heavily
dependent  on copper,  's  particularly  susceptible  to external  shocks. In thLs
regard  lncreased  foreign  aid  could  be very  effective  in mitigating  the
destabilizing  effects  of the  terms  of trade  shocks. This is likely  to be most
helpful  in  the  early  stages  of reform  to foster  credibility  and stabilize  the
free  rate,  before  the foreign  sector  can  start  to respond  to real
depreciation;  hence  there  will  be loes  need  for  aid  flows  to continue  at
initial  levels..79
TABLE I  (a):
Exchange  rate  potlcy  episodes In  ZambIa  1964-90
Period  Policy
1.  1964-71  Rate  fixed  to  the pournd  sterting.
1971q4-i6qZ  Rate  fixed  to  the  dollar.
2. 1976q3-83q3  From  Juty.  pegged to  the  SOR  with  occasional  devaluations.
3. 1983q3-85q3  From  JuLy,  the  SOR  link  substituted  by a crawing  peg on a basket  of
currenies  of  trade  partners.
4. 1985q4-87q2  Foreign exchange suction;  Dutch Auction;  two-tier  auction.
5.  1987q3-89q4  From  key,  a fixed  rate  to  the  dollar  with  occasional  devaluationr.
6.  1990ql-1991q1  From February,  a  dual  exchange rate  system.- 80 -
TABLE  1 (b):
Basic statistics  for  the  black  market  premium  and  black  rate
(monthly data)
PERIOD  N  MEAN  STANDARD  MINIMUM  4AXIMUM  COEFFICIENT  OF
DEVIATION  VALUE  VALUE  VARIATION  tX)
black market premium:
Oct.1970-  69  89.69  38.56  29.63  177.52  43.02
Jun.1976
Jul.1976-  84  102.27  59.50  19.32  260.10  58.18
Mar.1983
Jul.1983-  27  49.26  32.27  9.67  102.80  65.50
Sep.1985
Oct.1985-  21  40.26  31.69  -46.12  93.07  78.70
Jun.1987
Oct.1985-  20  44.58  25.39  15.67  93.07  59.95
Jun.1987  (2)
Jul.¶A87-  30  481.32  367.69  25.00  1221.48  76.39
Dec.1989
black  rate:
Oct.1970-  69  0.82  0.15  0.55  1.08  18.73
Jun.1976
Jul.1976-  84  0.63  0.14  0.35  0.85  21.88
Mar.1983
Jul.1983-  27  0.40  0.14  0.21  0.59  35.60
Sep.1985
Oct.1985-  21  0.10  0.03  0.04  0.14  29.67
Jun.1987
Jul.1987-  30  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.10  92.26
Dec.1989
SOURCE: Pick's  Currency  Yearbooks  and  International  Finance  Statistics.  CI.M.F.).
NOTES:
1.  Monthly  data  from  Pick's  Currency  Yearbooks.
2.  Period  4  statistics  for  the  premiLm  are  calculated  with  and  without  the  premium  of  -46  X  for  AprIl,  1987.
which  was  due  to  rapid  devaluation  of  the  official  rate  (the  black  rate  was  unaffected).-81  -
TABLE 2  (a):  Major  parity  changes  since  1964
Period  Parity  change
1964,  October  Zanibian  Pound  fully  convertible  with  Pound  Sterling.
1968,  January  Kwacha  (K) replaces  Zambian  Pound,  halving official  rate (KO.714/S),  and
decimal king.
1971,  Deceiber  Pound Sterling link substituted  by U.S. Dollar (KO.714/S):  a de facto
devaluation.  Gold  content  reduced  by  7.89  per  cent  on  18th  December.
1973,  February  Following  U.S.  devaluation,  realigned  to KO.643/S.
1976,  July  Dollar  link  substituted  by  SDR  (KlSDR1.08479):  a de  facto  devaluation  of 20
percent.
1978,  March  Devalued  by 10  per cent:  K1=SDRO.97631.
1983,  January  Devalued  by 20  per cent:  K1=SDRO.78105.
1983,  July  SDR link  substituted  by trade  weighted  basket:  a de facto  devaluation  of 11
per  cent;  crawl  rate  of 1  per  cent  per  month.
1984  Rate  of  crawl  increased  to  2.5  per  cent  per  month.
1985,  October  Rate  determined  by  marginal  market-clearing  bid  in  a  weekly  auction
adninistered  by  the  Central  8ank.
1986,  August  Dutch  auction  introduced:  successful  bidders  exchange  at their  bid,  not the
marginal  rate:  excess  accrues  as tax  revenue.
1987,  January  Auction  temporarily  suspended.
1987,  February  Official  Parity  Rate created  pegged  to a basket  of currencies,  with range
K9.0-12.5/S,  for  Goverment, Parastatal  and Central  Bank  transactions.
1987,  March  Weekly  auction  reinstated  for  all  other  transactions,  starting  at  K15/S  (two-
tier  auction).
1987,  May  Auction  suspended:  rates  unified  at K8/S  for  all transactions.
1988,  December  Devalued  to  KMM/S.
'989,  June  Devalued  to  K16/S.
1989,  December  Devalued  to  K24/S.
1990,  February  Two-tier  system:  official  rate  at  K28/S  and  managed  float  initialty  at  K40/S.
SOURCE:  World  Currency  Yearbook  (1986)  and  Central  Bank  publications.-82-
TABLE  3 (a):  The  parallel  premium  and the macro-economy.
YEAR  PREMIUM  DEPRECIATION  (M)  INFLATION  (X)  MONETARY  AGGREGATES
(ns  a#lEEi
4
n  pnr*II.I  rol  UD  ml  gr..th  e.igr,  M2IfVm
1964  . 0.0  . .
1965  . 0.0  . 7.4  . 15.1
1966  .0.0  . 10.8  . 37.5  4.4  17.1
1967  . 0.0  . 4.4  -0.9  15.9  1.7  17.7
1968  . 0.0  *  11.0  8.0  31.8  3.0  20.6
1969  0.0  *  2.3  9.8  12.8  *.0  21.4
1970  36  0.0  *  3.0  -2.2  2.6  0.2  29.2
1971  51  0.0  . 5.8  -6.1  6.8  0.6  27.0
1972  109  0.0  -28.0  5.5  4.9  1.4  0.1  25.3
1973  95  9.6  19.1  6.5  21.7  28.6  1.8  25.8
1974  80  1.3  8.0  7.9  13.4  2.6  0.1  23.3
1975  90  0.0  -3.5  10.2  -5.6  24.4  1.5  31.2
1976  161  -9.8  -36.2  18.5  17.9  21.1  1.1  32.9
1977  190  *9.7  *17.6  19.9  21.7  -1.9  -0.1  35.2
1978  124  -1.3  6.0  16.6  16.6  1.0  0.0  28.4
1979  85  0.8  48.4  9.6  24.2  30.2  1.1  31.3
1980  69  0.6  7.8  11.6  9.2  0.5  0.0  29.6
1981  64  -9.2  -5.1  14.2  5.3  8.6  0.2  28.1
1982  46  -6.5  4.0  12.4  6.7  2L.3  0.6  36.4
1983  29  -25.8  *17.7  19.5  24.1  15.3  0.4  34.8
1984  37  -30.3  -28.1  20.1  27.9  9.4  0.2  34.6
1985  68  -33.8  -52.3  37.4  47.3  41.6  0.6  29.7
1986  31  -62.9  -50.9  51.6  115.9  87.1  0.7  31.3
1987  42  -17.8  -20.3  43.1  84.4  40.0  0.2  31.9
1988  418  8.1  -59.2  55.6  . 62.7  0.3  45.0
YEAR  BUDGET  (%GDP)  CURR.  ACCOUNT  (lOP)  FOP.  FOR.
surplus  exp.  rev.  official  parallel  ASSEST  RESERVES  TOT
(net  X  GDP )S  mill)
1964  5.8  17.8  21.2  14.9  . . 17.
1965  3.4  21.3  26.7  8.7  . 21.0  196.0  195.6
1966  3.5  23.4  29.7  6.0  . 18.6  204.8  281.1
1967  -4.1  26.9  25.1  1.2  . 14.0  174.5  262.1
1968  -9.?  28.3  27.4  -0.2  . 13.2  193.5  269.7
1969  2.7  22.7  24.5  25.8  . 20.4  362.9  341.9
1970  1.9  26.6  34.2  6.3  *  31.3  508B0  307.4
1971  -16.4  . . -15.0  -22.4  15.4  277.1  209.0
1972  -13.1  32.1  21.9  *11.0  -22.8  5.6  158.4  191.3
1973  -16.7  29.5  24.0  5.3  10.2  4.3  185.5  254.2
1974  3.4  28.1  34.3  0.6  1.0  4.0  164.4  242.9
1975  -21.5  42.8  28.3  -29.3  -54.3  -3.8  142.0  115.1
1976  -14.2  36.1  23.9  -4.7  -12.3  -4.7  92.7  129.3
1977  -13.1  35.6  25.1  -8.6  -24.7  -7.1  66.3  118.8
1978  -14.4  29.7  24.4  -10.6  -28.3  -33.3  51.1  103.2
1979  -9.1  30.4  22.3  1.1  2.0  -22.9  80.0  117.9
1980  -18.5  37.1  25.0  -13.8  -23.4  -27.0  78.2  100.0
1981  -12.9  36.7  23.2  -18.5  -30.0  -33.2  56.2  79.8
1982  -18.6  39.0  23.1  -14.6  -21.3  -40.3  58.2  70.8
1983  -7.8  32.2  24.2  -8.1  -10.7  -47.1  54.5  77.9
1984  -8.4  29.2  22.1  -5.6  -7.1  -54.2  54.2  70.1
1985  -14.9  34.9  21.8  -15.3  -27.0  -93.5  200.1  71.5
1986  -16.2  . 23.3  -16.9  -22.6  -112.5  70.3  71.5
1987  -13.7  4.9  21.1  -6.4  -8.8  -55.8  108.8  79.7
1988  *12.9  34.3  20.9  -7.2  -38.9  -54.1  134.0
SOURCE:  Goverrment  FInancial  rcatistics  (IMF);  Internasiona'  Financial  Stcistics  (IMF);  Central  Bank
.ablications;  Pick's  Currency  Yearbooks.-83~
TABLE 3  lb):  Zambian  copper dependence, 1964-1989
Year  Cu  export  Cu  price  Cu  value  Cu  earnings  ineral  revenu
volumes  (constant  (X  of  CDP)  (X  of  total  (X  of  total
(1963=100)  '63  prices)  forex)  revenie)
1964  116.8  43.05  59.12  88.46
1965  117.1  56.98  48.27  90.22
1966  102.7  65.10  54.31  93.31  65.13
1967  103.0  47.96  45.3S  92.34  61.45
1966  110.3  52.62  48.59  94.80  57.58
1969  12S5.2  59.26  55.13  94.52  58.62
1970  117.3  53.77  55.89  95.30  55.50
1971  108.9  38.96  38.12  92.78  36.92
1972  122.0  35.47  36.41  90.63  18.84
1973  115.1  51.02  43.93  94.20  28.09
1974  115.5  48.29  44.43  92.68  52.32
1975  110.0  26.11  29.75  90.40  13.29
1976  127.9  29.17  36.31  91.59  2.56
1977  114.3  24.81  32.52  91.22  0.00
1978  101.6  22.48  26.55  87.02  0.02
1979  111.7  28.84  33.86  82.62  0.00
1980  95.6  28.93  28.53  85.44  5.45
1981  94.6  22.97  23.73  88.31  1.30
1982  106.2  20.09  23.79  90.00  0.00
1983  98.9  21.87  22.23  88.31  5.2?
1984  89.7  19.27  20.91  87.12  8.68
1985  82.3  19.68  27.72  79.98  8.40
1986  78.9  15.75  28.12  97.37  13.42
1987  83.1  17.98  34.92  85.06  4.85
1988  68.3  24.86  36.89  84.76  2.20
SOURCE: Zambian  Monthly  Digest  of  Statistics.- 84-
TABLE 3 (cl:  Short-run  influences  on the  black market premium  during  the  auction  period.
Month  Auction  BM  SM  Shocks  and signals
rate  rate  premium
SEP85  0.461  0.270  41.365  - Interest  rates  decontrolled.
OCT85  0.190  0.100  4.445  - Auction  instituted;  import  Licenses
NOV85  0.171  0.120  29.825  abolished;  no  funds  import  licenses.
DEC85  0.174 0.130  25.296
JAN86  0.168  0.110  34.468
FEB86  0.152 0.130  14.494  - Increase  in  dollars  offered  amounced;
MAR86  0.145  0.120  17.313  I.M.F.  standby  concluded;  TAZARA  etc
APR86  0.144  0.120  16.605  included  in  auction.
MAY86  0.141  0.100  29.200  - Chivuno appointed governor of  BOZ.
JUN86  0.136  0.110  19.34  - Bids  published  from  this  date.
JUL86  0.150  0.130  13.550  - Stringent  documentation  req.irements.
AUG86  0.178  0.140  21.483  - Dutch  Auction;  "auction  pipeline"  begins;
SEP86  0.154  0.100  34.900  monetary  measures  to  control  money  supply.
OCT86  0.116  0.060  48.204  - Reduction  in  dollars  offered  announced.
NOV86  0.081  0.050  38.511  - Bid  deposit  of  30X, bank rate  30X  .
DEC86  0.077 0.060  22.149  - Maize  price  decontrol,  food  riots;  recontrol.
JAN87 0.073  0.040  44.899  - Auction  suspended  from  28th  Jan.  for
FEB87 0.111  0.070  36.772  nine  weeks.
MAR87  0.113  0.090  20.195  - Two-tier  auction  from  28th  March;
APR87  0.054  0.100 -85.586  bid  deposit  raised  to  40X  .
MAY87  0.125  0.100  20.000  - Auction  abolished  1st  May:  rate  K15/S  for
JUN87  0.125  0.070  44.000  allocation  on  2nd  May,  thereafter  K8/S.-aS  -
TABLE  6 la):
Expected  disparities  for  iMport data  comparisous in  the  presence of
trade  policy  and a black  market premium
1  2  3  4  5  6
Activity  PC  Pct  Pc(1*t)-Pd Pct(1*t)-Pd Pf-Pc  Of-Qc  PfQf-Pcac
price  0..  +  +  - - 0  -
price  U.l  0
quantity  U.1.  l  +  0  +
smuggling  0  +  0  +  +
SOURCE:  Adapted  from Shagwati (1981).
NOTES:
1.  For  the  imported comnodity:
Pf  is  the  f.o.b.  price,  corrected  for  insurance  nd freight;
Pc  the  declared  landed price  at  customs (i.e.  c.i.f.  prices  before  tariffs  and taxes  are  imposed);
Pct  the  "trueU  tanded price,  equal  to  Pc  in  the  absence  of  misinvoicing;
Pd the  domestic  price  defined  as  PdzPct+tPc,  i.e.  the  true  landed  price  plus  the  tariff  as  applied  to  the  declared
prico;
of  the  partner-country  recorded export  quantity;
Qc  the  recorded  iport  quantity;
t  the  legal  tariff  rate;
2. The  inequality  signs  f, (3)  obtain  for  the  folloaing  reason:
pct(l.t)-pdapct-tpct-pct-tpcst(pct-pt),  i.e.  regative  for  over-Invoicing- 86 -
TABLE d  Ib):  Partner-CountrY-data  trade  conparisons:  percentage  faked  invoficng  (a-values).
YEAR  U.K.  U  .A  Six  Major  Partners  O.E.C.D.
1968  36.86  73.76  35.98  36.34
1969  30.61  76.16  34.15  31.89
1970  36.48  64.51  29.80  29.31
1971  13.25  58.49  20.02  20.77
1972  15.86  44.41  13.22  16.91
1973  13.17  22.56  -1.10  2.20
1974  3.69  -9.41  -12.59  -15.85
1975  3.32  34.54  14.05  9.41
1976  32.7?  47.71  9.A9  2.?7
1977  2.67  48.98  12.91  8.59
1978  12.54  8.18  7.05  6.41
1979  6.10  2.65  0.03  -4.10
1980  2.23  -21.63  -8.76  3.76
1981  17.52  32.94  15.50  2.3?
1982  20.00  37.83  10.78  10.61
1983
1984  -14.27  -56.44  -30.71  -29.27
1985  -8.09  2.67  -14.79  -14.5S
SOURCE:  Direction  of Trade  Statistics  (INF)  and  Foreign  Trade  Statistics,
NOTES:
1.  The trade  ratios  are  R a  ;00.CNz-Xf)/Xf,  where Nz  are  Zamiban-recorded  f.o.b.  Imports  and  Xf,
partner  country-  recorded  f  o.b.  exports.
2.  The six  mrin  trAding  partners,  excluding  South  Africa  and Saudi  Arabia,  *re  U.S.A.,  U.K..  France,  Italy,
Japan  and Germany.
3.  For  alt  imports  in  1983 and  1986-88  and for  imports  from  Japan  In  1981  only  partner  data  woa  available.
4.  Simple  two-year  averages  for export  and import  figures  to alleviate  discrepancies  due to ltagged  reporting
smoothed  but did  not alter  trendrs.  These  smoothed  rntios  were  used  for  the regressions  reported  in Tables  4
Cd)  and  Ce).
5.  No adjustment  was required  for  transport  costs:  Zambian  import  data  is  reported  on  an  f.o.b.
basis.
6.  Given  currency  convertibility  In the  trading  partners  considered  (this  would  not have applied  to
South  Africa)  the likelihood  of faked  export  invoicing  is  diminished  and  w"  not corrected  for.- 87  -
TABLE e  {c}:  Quantifying  faked  invoicing  using  import  value  comparisons  (1975.100).
YEAR  Kenya  IUV  Zafbia  IUV  Percent  Zambia  import  Value
(manuf.)  (manuf.)  extra  0.1  volume  index  ('75  k  mit)
1965  43.37  43.97  1.40  75.11  7.67
1966  43.37  41.13  -5.15  80.85  -30.48
1967  43.37  42.57  -1.83  101.82  -13.64
1968  44.51  44.31  0.45  101.04  -3.31
1969  44.51  45.76  2.81  99.90  20.52
1970  49.07  50.59  3.11  98.23  22.33
1971  53.64  54.64  1.86  108.95  14.87
1972  59.35  59.69  0.57  102.96  4.31
1973  70.10  68.77  -1.90  80.00  -11.11
1974  93.55  83.78  -10.45  102.64  -78.49
1975  100.00  99.99  -0.01  100.00  -0.04
1976  103.13  108.60  5.30  70.14  27.23
1977  126.31  122.08  -3.35  67.52  -16.54
1978  148.80  141.81  -4.70  49.78  -17.11
1979  162.28  166.50  2.60  51.48  9.81
1980  195.25  185.38  -5.05  48.47  -17.93
1981  225.63  328.41  45.55  32.17  107.27
1982  240.53  304.03  26.40  20.24  39.13
1983  363.46  381.17  4.87  11.94  4.26
1984  492.97  602.87  22.29  9.70  15.83
1985  817.94  624.15  -23.69  9.76  -16.94
1986  2101.25  1190.69  -43.33  15.93  -50.55
SOURCE:  Kenyan  Statistical  Abstracts  and  Zambian  Monthly  Digests  of  Statistics.
NOTES:
1.  The  inport  unit  value  indices  for  Kenya and  Zambia were  disaggregated  and only  the
manufacturing  sector  IUVs used  for  comparison.
2.  The  choice  of  1975=100  is  due to minimpl  overinvoicing  in  that  year  according  to
partner-country-data  trade  comparisons.- 88-
TABLE  6 (d):  Statistics  for  tho  smuggling  incentive  and  trade  ratios.
Country Time  INCENTIVE  TRADE  RATIO  Correlation  Trade
mean  range  mean  range  coefficient  Variable
Zaire  1964-78  1.64  0.71-3.22  1.71  1.28-2.29  0.21  all  exports
1972-78  1.81  1.04-3.22  1.90  1.40-2.29  0.53  all  exports
Zambia  1969-80 1.27  0.43-2.38  1.15  1.03-1.35  0.65  imports (U.K.)
1.35  0.88-1.75 0.64  imports  (U.S.A.)
0.71  0.06-1.50  1.12  0.92-1.35  0.65  imports  (Six  part.)
1.11  0.91-1.34  0.64  impsrts  (O.E.C.D.)
SOURCE: Calculations  based  on  Table  6 (b);  McDonald  (1985).
NOTES:
1.  Zaire  was  the  only  African  country  studied  in  McDonald  (1985):  here  adapted  from  his  Table  2.
2.  Incentive:  I=(qI(1-ti)-1,  where  q is  the  black  market  premium  and  ti,  a  trade  policy  prcx!y.
3.  Trade  Ratio:  Zambian  recorded  imports/partner  country  recorded  exports  (two  year  averages).
TABLE 6 l1a:  Regressions of  the  trade  ratios o'-  the  smuggling  incentives.
Country  Time  constant  I  T  Ii.  Dumfies DW  AdJ. R2  Trade
period  t-1  Variable
Zaire  1964-78  1.56  0.09  - 1.23  0.22  All  exports
(4.45) (0.73)
0.26  0.02  0.73  -0.17
Zambia 1969-80  0.30  0.01  0.72  -0.17  1.63  0.85  0.E.C.D.  imports
(1.73)  (0.43)  (5.89)  (-3.45)
(D.741
1969-80  0.12  0.02  0.83  0.10  2.16  0.67  0.E.C.D.  imports
(0.51)  (0.45)  (4.57)  (1.25)  2.14  0.66
0.57  0.39  4.50  (D.761
0.14  0.12  0.82  -0.08  0.06
1969-80  0.11  0.09  0.83  -0.06  0.07  1.53  0.66  O.E.C.D.  imports
(0.32)  (1.60)  (3.34)  ;1.16)  (0.61)  1.44  0.65
0.61  1.54  3.20  1.14  (D.751
Source:  Data  in  Table  6(d);  McDonald  (1985).
NOTES:
1. The  regression  for  Zaire  excludes  1971  (McDonald,  1985).
2. Dummy  years  indicated  below  the  t-statistics*1
o 
-t  I,  -
I.  n  at  190
TABLE  7 lb):  Centrol  Bank profits  due to  foreign  exchnge  transactions.
(13  (22  (32  (43  (53  [66  [73 Date  Export  Xp  MP  Not  Auction-  Central  Bank  Net profits earnings  (forex  (forex  purchases  related  profits.  P  as  X
_S.")  m  !rcheses)  sales)  ($SM)  loans($,m) (kwacha,m)  annual  GDP
JAN86  57.3  40.7  26.6  14.1  25.9  44.18  0.34 FEB86  59.4  34.8  32.2  2.6  0.0  2.90  0.02 MAR86  59.8  40.7  40.1  0.6  8.8  0.87  0.05 APR86  59.1  41.6  37.8  3.8  14.8  5.26  0.04 MAY86  67.0  47.1  26.7  20.4  15.6  59.57  0.46 JUN86  51.2  30.7  29.9  0.8  20.1  1.41  0.01 JUL86  57.0  35.1  34.2  0.9  7.8  0.94  0.00 AUG86  65.2  46.5  36.6  9.9  4.7  15.19  0.12 SEP86  64.8  37.0  26.8  10.2  7.8  35.60  0.27 OCT86  49.8  17.6  19.4  -1.8  0.9-  -14.46  -0.11 NOV86  48.8  36.1  16.4  19.7  0.3  151.73  1.17
DEC86  65.4  45.2  13.6  31.6  0,4  116.65  0.59 JAN87  58.9  26.'  11.7  14.9  0.0  167.25  0.85 FEB87  51.2  20.2  20.5  -0.3  22.0  -1.58  0.00 MAR8t  83.0  39.6  23.0  16.6  0.2  37.25  0.20 APR87  53.8  23.4  23.7  -0.3  15.4  2.57  0.01 MAY87  61.3  33.7  27.2  6.5  0.0  13.00  0.07 Jua.97  70.3  39.4  16.0  23.4  0.0  147.09  0.75 JUL87  94.1  63.1  23.6  39.5  0.0  122.89  0.63 AUG87  75.0  42.3  56.0  -13.7  2.7  -27.40  -0.14 SEP87  49.1  21.8  28.8  -7.0  0.0  -21.78  -0.11 OCT87  87.4  29.4  26.7  2.7  0.0  12.15  0.06 NOV87  109.7  56.7  46.9  11.8  0.0  53.10  0.27 DEC87  94.4  47.6  29.8  17.8  0.0  111.89  0.57
SOURCE:  Calculations  usinr  manthly data  from Bank of  Zambia Foreign Exchange  Budget Reports.
NOTES:
1.  Xn  is  central  bank purchases of  foreign  exchange  from ZCCN  (Zambia Consotidated Coqper  Mining  Company)  and non- trod;tionat  exporters,  les their  foreign  exchange  retantions  (which are  C13-C23).
2.  Np is  central  bank sales  of  foreign  exchange  to  the  private  sector  ("total  auctionable  funds"  in  the  BOZ  budget). The source is  auction-related  loans  (53 nd  portion  of (23.
3.  Column W43C21-C33  shows  the  gove.nment to  be a small  net  buyer  of  foreign  exchange. The effect  of  auction- related  g-ants  and loans  Is  to  dfmfnish  this  position.
4.  Profits  on  foreign  exchange  transaecons  alone  due to  the  presence of  dual  rates  were estimated  as follows: Pu(Xp-Mp).(Eb-E0),  where  Eb  is  the  bls  k  rate  and  EO the  official  rate  of  exchange.- 91
TABLE 7 (ca:  An  smirical  assassmnt  of  the  location  of  unification  episodes on the  Seigniorage
Laffer  Curve.
AVEItAGE  NMNT__  __
EXCHANGE  RATE  I  q  &Eo/Eo  real  deficit  credib.
EPISODE  ('80  prices)  rating
Crawling  peg regine:
1.  Jui83-OctSM  1.4  1.2  3.4  -169  good
2.  NovB4-Sep85  2.9  1.9  0.7  *163  diminifhed
Aucton  rgimne:
1.  OctBS-Aug86  3.5  89  1.3  2.9  -237  good
(STABLE)
wt  3.8
2.  SepS6-Apr87  4.3  -470  1.6  20.6  -589  poor
(UNSTABLE)
SOURCE:  Calculatfons  using  mnnthly date  (IFS)  *nd  quarterly  budetary  data
Clank of  Zabia  Quarterly  reports).
NOTES:
1.  stems  from equation  7. 10'  and ka  estimated  from October,  1986 to  April.  1987.
2.  The  first  month  of  the  auction  wa  excluded  from  the  caicutation  of  average inflation  during  the  stable  uction
phase.  In  the  wi-table  phse, the  two  months  of  suspension  and  the  final  month  of  the  auction  were  excluded.  If
September,  1986  (Chen  a  sharp  monetary  contraction  occurred)  is  excluded  in  the  unstable  phase,  average  inflation
rises  from  4.3  to  6.
3.  The  credibility  rating  stem from  the  analysis  In  Section  III  and  Table  3  Cc).-92  -
FIGURE 1:
The quarterty black market premium for Zambic
showing  exchange rate  episodes.
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FIGURE  2 (a):
Nominal and real effective exchange rates by episode
(1980= 1  00 for the official rate)
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AN INCREASE  IN THE  INDEX  DENOTES  APPRECIATION.
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diamond: real effective exchange rate calculated  using the official  rate
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FIGURE  3 (b):
World  Copper Prices: LME  prices in

















diamond: constant prices96  -
FIGURE3 (c):
Expectations  of a maxi-devaluotion:
(monthly  black  market  premium  Jon.1982-Jul.1983).
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FIGURE  3 (d):
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KEY:
square: quarterly official  rate depreciation
diamond: quarterty parallel rate depreciationFigure  3(e):  EXPECTED DEVALUATION
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FIGURE  6 (a):
A proxy for trade policy in Zambia: ratio of imported to













AN  INCREASE  IMPUES  TRADE  UBERALSATIONFIGURE  6 (b);
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KEY:
square: annual parallel rate depreciation
triangle: annual CPI inflation
diamond: annual WP  inflation- 102  -
FIGURE  7 (b):
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square: annual parallel rote depreciation
triangle: annual inflation rate of price index for
wholesale manufacturing  price index excluding food, bovernges and tobacco
diamond: annual inflation rote of the food. beverages and
tobacco sub-sector  of the wholesale manufacturing  price index- 103  -
FIGURE 7  (c)
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FIGURE  7 (d):
Inflation  and exchange  rate depreciation  during  the auction
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APPENDIX  TABLE  A.2 la):  A  sumwary  of  the  exchange  rate  comrponents  of  I .M.F.
programmes  with  Zaobia 1976-8S.
1.  The 1976-77 stand-by  included  a 20 per cent  devaluatfon  of  the  kwacha  in  terms of  the  SOR.
2.  A 10  per  cent  devaluation  against  the  SOR  was  a  condition  of  the  1978-80  stand-by.
3.  The  1981-83  oxtended  facility  conditions  for  the  external  sector  were  that  the  government  should
periodically  review  and  adjust  the  exchange  rate  for  the  maintenanes  of  compotitiveness.
4.  The  1983-4  stand-by  agreement  aimed  to  arrest  the  deterioration  in  the  balance  of  payments.  In
January.  1983  a  20  per  cent  devaluation  against  the  SDR  occurred  and  in  July,  1983,  a flexible
exchange  rate  policy  was  adopted.  delinking  the  kwacha  from  the  SOR  and  pegging  it  to  a  basket  of
six currencies.
S.  A  1984-86  stand-by  facility  aimed  in  the  external  sector  to  consolidate  the  progress  of  1983  in
reducing  external  fmbalance.  The  facility  was  inactive  during  1985  and  canceled  in  February,  1986.- 109  -
APPENDIX  TABLE  A.3  (a):
A summary  of the  weekty  auction  resuits.
Auction:  Numcer  of  bids:  Kwacha  DoLtars:  Bid  Exchange
week  date  totat  accepted  offered  req.  atloc.  Range  rate
1  11/10/85  2  94  79  2.75-15.00  5.01
2  18/10  397  137  82.8  12.5  5.0  3.11-12.00  6.10
3  25/10  345  186  69.1  10.3  5.2  2.44-9.15  7.00
4  31/10  270  241  74.1  10.2  7.5  4.66-9.00  6.44
5  08/11  232  181  52.6  8.1  6.2  4.22-7.50  6.25
6  15/11  229  195  30.8  4.8  4.1  3.50-7.50  6.03
7  23/11  234  213  31.2  5.0  3.9  4.22-7.50  5.80
8  30/11  205  166  29.9  4.9  4.2  5.00-7.05  5.75
9  07/12  187  169  27.3  4.6  4.2  4.22-7.00  5.74
10  14/12  201  180  30.7  5.2  4.5  5.50-6.65  5.75
11  21/12  172  160  27.3  4.6  4.3  5.60-7.05  5.77
12  28/12  101  100  21.0  3.5  3.5  5.60-6.65  5.70
13  04/01/86  117  106  29.5  5.0  4.6  4.95-6.50  5.76
14  11/01  164  105  31.9  5.4  4.1  4.52-6.50  5.36
15  18/01  234  102  41.5  6.7  3.3  4.52-7.50  6.01
16  25/01  309  151  67.7  10.2  4.7  4.52-7.50  6.40
17  01/02  287  260  40.6  6.5  6.1  4.00-7.50  6.36
18  08/02  254  143  44.2  7.2  3.9  4.00-7.11  6.51
19  15/02  281  205  45.2  6.7  5.2  5.05-7.50  6.68
20  22/02  304  191  75.7  11.9  7.7  5.05-7.50  6.78
21  01/03  301  136  71.5  10.2  5.4  5.54-7.50  7.01
22  08/03  287  141  55.9  7.7  5.9  6.00-8.00  6.90
23  15/03  246  143  53.2  7.4  5.6  6.50-9.50  6.75
24  22/03  357  253  76.2  10.8  8.8  6.00-7.65  6.91
25  29/03  193  173  57.7  8.3  7.4  6.00-7.60  6.85
26  05/04  258  216  58.1  8.3  7.2  6.50-7.60  6.87
27  12/04  246  171  64.9  9.3  3.7  4.50-7.50  6.98
28  19/04  273  176  81.5  11.4  8.6  6.50-7.50  7.06
29  26/04  281  196  64.3  8.8  6.8  4.50-7.50  6.98
30  03/05  236  200  50.9  7.2  6.3  4.50-7.50  7.00
31  10/05  274  234  63.3  8.9  7.6  5.50-7.50  7.03
32  17/05  297  148  75.3  10.6  3.7  5.50-7.50  7.11
33  24/05  279  153  50.9  7.8  4.0  5.50-7.50  7.23
34  31/05  332  244  75.0  10.1  7.3  6.25-8.00  7.31
35  07/06  318  170  53.2  7.3  4.0  6.50-8.00  7.26
36  14/06  397  244  82.2  11.1  7.0  6.51-7.75  7.32
37  21/06  383  267  90.2  12.2  8.0  7.10-7.65  7.39
38  28/06  404  134  92.2  12.3  7.0  5.00-7.61  7.51
39  05/07  518  151  116.6  15.2  7.6  5.50-7.70  7.71
40  11/07  451  168  103.1  13.9  7.3  5.50-9.00  8.07
41  19/07  396  82  12b.0  15.2  4.4  5.00-9.51  5.03
42  26/07  600  155  166.7  23.5  7.5  4.01-9.53  6.08
43  02/08  760  634  169.0  24.0  20.8  5.01-9.10  5.01
44  09/08  501  329  99.3  17.5  10.3  4.01-7.53  5.35
45  16/08  542  220  89.4  15.4  6.0  4.50-6.85  5.76
46  23/08  621  173  111.3  18.2  3.8  5.00-6.85  6.26
47  30/08  690  264  136.7  20.4  9.9  5.00-7.75  6.87
48  06/09  674  501  165.0  22.8  13.6  5.00-7.99  7.00
49  13/09  418  326  94.7  12.9  11.7  5.00-8.01  5.64
50  20/09  484  99  101.5  14.8  3.1  4.50-7.83  6.37
51  27/09  606  167  136.9  20.1  6.0  5.10-8.00  7.09
52  04/10  712  172  165.1  22.3  5.6  5.04-8.11  7.64
53  11/10  769  128  177.5  22.8  5.0  5.50-8.56  8.30
54  18/10  734  125  192.8  22.6  2.6  5.06-10.25  9.35
55  25/10  493  84  150.0  17.3  4.1  5.50-11.51  10.32
56  01/11  517  119  146.9  13.8  4.0  6.00-12.50  11.51
57  08/11  439  111  133.1  12.2  4.2  6.00-13.15  12.30
58  15/11  407  116  138.5  11.3  4.2  6.00-14.41  13.48
59  22/11  324  122  134.4  8.4  4.1  6.00-15.17  14.68
60  29/11  273  140  104.4  7.2  4.1  6.00-16.52  15.25
61  06/12  221  130  5.6  4.1  6.00-18.00  12.10
62  13/12  333  107  12.4  4.0  6.00-16.00  11.90
63  20/12  310  116  8.4  4.0  6.00-13.77  12.50
64  27/12  258  141  6.6  4.1  6.00-14.20  12.71
65  03/01/87  192  118  5.7  4.1  6.00-13.76  12.97
66  10/01  232  55  9.9  4.1  6.00-13.98  13.51
67  17/01  257  111  8.9  4.0  6.00-15.00  14.12
68  24/01  250  109  8.9  4.8  6.00-15.31  14.92
Is  28/03/87  625  151  9.10-20.00  15.00
2a  04/04  457  62  9.25-20.00  16.99
3a  11/04  370  71  13.00-20.75  18.75
4a  16/04  270  81  13.00-21.50  19.95
5a  24/04  250  98  14.00-23.90  21.01
6a  02/05  192  158  15.00-25.00  15.00
*  nhnnS  _X-  n  nt  C'  _4O  at  A nn  fr/%%
SOURCE: 1.  Bank  of  Zambia  unpubtished  study:  "The  Foreign  Exchange  Auction  System:  a  review  of  the  first  year  of
operations".  for  auctions  1  to  35.
2.  The  UTimes  of Zambia"  for  auctions  36 to  68 and  1a  to  6a.110
Table  A.5 (a)
The  Parallel  Premiun  and its  determinants:
Tests  for  Normality  (Annual  Data)
Variable  Skewness  Kurtosis
Unconditional  distribution
1.  tog  q  1.73  (0.005)*  3.85 (.005)
2.  4log  q  2.96 (0.00002)  9.10 (.14x10)
Conditional  Distribution
3.  Residual  of eq.23'  0.33  -0.96
(0.56)  (1.09)
Table  A.5  (b)
Dickey  Fuller  and  Augmented  Dickey  Fuller
Tests  for  Unit  Roots
(Zambia)
Variable  DF  ADF  Differenced  DF  ADF
log  q  -0.91  -2.31  ALogq  -6.53  -4.35
log  m  -2.12  -2.29  Alogm  -10.05  -2.76
log  e  -1.83  -2.23  &loge  -10.51  -2.98
IPD  -2.85  -1.09  AIPD  -5.06  -1.14
Residual  of
equation  (23')  -3.23  -3.03
Notes:
q =  Black  Market  Rate/Official  Exchange  Rate
m =  Broad  Money/Official  Exchange  Rate
e =  Official  Exchange  Rate/CPI
IPo  =1  +  it)  ALog  Eo  (  +  I
where  A  log E  is  obtained  from  the appendix  equation  (A.1),
°t+1
and  1m=  (rM  )c*ill 
TABLE  A.J  c)
The Slack Market Promium  and Related Macroeconomic  Variables  in  Zaabie
Year  Premium  TOT  Official  Z  Ilnt.Rete  Forn.Trd.
Aid  Nominal  Per.  01ff.  Tax/GOP  (1)
(USS  mill)  tk  milL)
1970  1.36  314.20  356.00  NA  NA
1971  1.51  191.80  319.00  -0.02  NA
1972  2.09  164.80  1.30  341.00  -0.07  .3.15
1973  1.95  240.50  1.40  411.00  -0.17  2.08
1974  1.80  171.70  0.90  441.00  -0.07  2.03
1975  1.90  100.60  14.50  494.00  0.59  2.41
1976  2.61  111.30  8.90  623.00  0.23  1.59
1977  2.90  95.40  33.80  699.00  0.11  1.70
1978  2.24  90.90  19.50  639.00  -0.01  1.47
1979  1.85  108.30  25.80  832.00  0.24  1.71
1980  1.69  100.00  25.60  907.00  0.43  2.08
1981  1.64  79.80  24.00  979.00  0.47  1.79
1982  1.46  70.90  29.10  1309.00  0.28  2.04
1983  1.29  77.90  53.70  1454.00  0.41  2.47
1984  1.37  70.10  23.00  1704.00  0.19  3.61
1985  1.68  71.50  19.70  2102.00  0.88  4.93
1986  1.31  71.50  173.20  4062.00  0.44  7.87
1987  1.42  79.70  289.90  6266.00  0.12  6.95
1988  5.18  831.60  0.16  3.61
NOTES:
Premfus  *a  3lckmrket Rate/Official  Exchange  Rate
Interest  Rate  Parity  Differential  calculated  as:
C(I4JWROI(t))'(14EHATCt+1))/(1+ZROI  hat  Ct))))-1,  where
zAbX  (  )  * ZROI;  ZROI is  the  Zambia  domestic  interest  rate  given  by the  anmualized 3-6  months
fixed  deposits  rate  of  the  comaerciat banks, and  WROI  Is  the  afiualized  deposit  rate  for  the  U.K.
EHAT  (Expected  0evalustion):  estimated  from  Equation  A.1'
EXPECTED  DEALUATION
Equation  (A.1')
A1ogZ~--2..19*0.17  logq,~  -0.29  1ogq1-2
(-3.82)  (1.  6)  (-1  76)
+0.821ogq,.,  0.69  loW..,
(4.38)  (.-5.36)
(-1.06)  (-2.17)
+0.69Iog.  -:0.52  1o9g6"





t  0.58, Rt  a  0.51,  DW  *  1.99.
Q(24) a 15.36
ct*statfstiCs  in  parenthefs)Fig  A-1:  BLACK MARKET PREMIUM
IN  ZAMBIA (Quarterly)











0  _  -T-  r1-  T -r-r-T  -1  -7-i  - -r-T-T-T--r--r--r  r - T-Tr  I  I  I  I  I  I  T  I  I  r-T|-T-T 7-TTT--  e  e-1-7  T--F  T  - . - l  ,,-r-r  -T-7  T
1970:1  1972:1  1974:1  1976:1  1978:1  1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:1  1988:1
TIME









0.0  1  rT  Tr  rr-T-r-  -- F-r-r-r-T-r--r---r  I  I  I  I I  II  I  I  I  I  . ErTaT  T  IT  -Tl-r-,-rrrTT  T  **
1970:1  1972:1  1974:1  1976:1  1978:1  1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:1  1988:1
TIME
n  RERFig  A-3:  REAL MONEY SUPPLY




w~  ~~~~  ~~~  RE.1M






1970:1  1972:1  1974:t  1976:1  1978:1  1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:1  1988:1
TIME
0  REAL  M2Fig  A-4:INTEREST  RATE PARITY DIFFERENTL








-0  .3  -rTrT.-  TI  - TWzl|WIIXIIXF7nIS81-  [rl  I  I  N-  Trr  -TEr
1970:1  1972:1  1974:1t  1976:1  1978:1  1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:  1  1988:1
TIME
O  IPDPolicy  Research  Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS891  Public  Institutions  and Private  Andrew  Stone  April  1992  G. Orraca-Tetteh
Transactions:  The Legal  and  Brian Levy  37646
Regulatory  Environment  for Business Ricardo  Paredes
Transactions  in Brazil  and  Chile
WPS892  Evaluating  the Asset-Based  Minimum Antonio  Estache  April 1992  A. Estache
Tax on Corporations:  An  Option-  Sweder  van Wijnbergen  81442
Pricing  Approach
WPS893  The  Evolving  Legal  Framework  for  Cheryl  W.  Gray
Private  Sector  Activity in Slovenia  Franjo  D. Stiblar
WPS894  Social  Indicators  and Productivity  Gregory  Ingram  April 1992  J. Ponchamni
Convergence  in Developing  Countries  31022
WPS895  How  Can  Debt  Swaps  Be  Used  Mohua  Mukhe'jee  April 1992  Y. Arellano
for Development?  31379
WPS896  Achievement  Evaluation  George  Psacharopoulos  April 1992  L. Longo
of Colombia's  Escuela  Nueva:  Carlos  Rojas  39244
Is Multigrade  the Answer?  Eduardo  Velez
WPS897  Unemployment  Insurance  for  Daniel  S. Hamermesh  May 1992  S. Khan
Developing  Countries  33651
WPS898  Reforming  Finance  in Transitiona:  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.  April 1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
Socialist  Economies:  Avoiding  the  Ross Levine  37664
Path  from Shell  Money  to Shell  Games
WPS899  The  Financing  of Small  Firms  Christian  Harm  May 1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
in Germany  37664
WPS900  The  Relationship  between  German  Christian  Harm  May 1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
Banks  and  Large  German  Firms  37664
WPS901  Opening  the Capital  Account:  James  A. Hanson  May 1992  D. Bouvet
A Survey  of Issues  and Results  35285
WPS902  Public  Sector  "Debt  Distress"  Paul Beckerman  May  1992  A. Blackhurst
in Argentina,  1988-89  37897
WPS903  The  Economic  Effects  of Minimum  Federico  Changanaqui  May 1992  D. Ballantyne
Import  Prices  (With  An Application  Patrick  Messerlin  37947
to Uruguay
WPS904  World  Bank  Policy  on Tobacco  May  1992  0. Nadora
31091
WPS905  Investing  in Allthe People  Lawrence  H. Summers  May 1992  M. Fernandez
33766Policy  Research  Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS906  Bulgaria's  Evolving  Legal  Framework Cheryl  W.  Gray  May 1992  CECSE
for Private  Sector  Development  Peter lanachkov  37188
WPS907  Institutional  Reform  in Emerging  Robert  Pardy  May 1992  Z. Seguis
Securities Markets  37664
WPS908  Tax incentives,  Mlarket  Power,  and  Dagmar  Rajagopal  May 1992  C. Jones
Corporate  lns  astment: A Rational  Anwar  Shah  37669
Expectations  Model  Applied  to Pakistani
and Turkish Industries
VPS909  Parailel  Markets,  the Foreign  Janine  Aron  May 1992  V. Barthelmes
Exchange  Auction,  and Exchange  Ibrahim  A. Elbadawi  39175
Rate Unification  in Zambia